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1457 
DISENTANGLING CONSCIENCE AND 
RELIGION 
Nathan S. Chapman 
What does “liberty of conscience” mean?  Religious liberty?  
Freedom of strong conviction?  Freedom of thought?  Since the 
Founding Era, Americans have used liberty of conscience to paper 
over disputes about the proper scope of religious, moral, and philo-
sophical liberty.  This Article explores the relationship between con-
science and religion in history, political theory, and theology, and 
proposes a conception of conscience that supports a liberty of con-
science distinct from religious liberty.  In doing so, it offers a theoreti-
cal basis for distinguishing between conscience and religion in First 
Amendment scholarship and related fields.  Conscience is best under-
stood, for purposes of legal theory, as a universal faculty that issues 
moral commands and judgments.  This conception overlaps with reli-
gion but is not concentric with it.  On one hand, conscience may be 
informed by religious beliefs (or by nonreligious beliefs).  On the 
other, religious beliefs and practices may be entirely independent of 
conscience.  Protecting fidelity to conscience, whether religious or 
nonreligious, promotes integrity and undermines the government’s 
pretensions to moral totalitarianism.  This conception of conscience is 
coherent enough to support a legal right and valuable enough to de-
serve one. 
  
 
   Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  This article is better for the gen-
erous engagement of Amy Coney Barrett, Will Baude, Ash Bhagwat, Sam Bray, Jud Campbell, Kenny 
Ching, Marc DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Rick Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Michael McConnell, Andy 
Koppelman, Michael Perry, Steve Smith, and Derek Webb.  Special thanks to Betty Chapman, who 
taught Huckleberry Finn to thousands of Missouri high school students in spite of the cost. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Huckleberry Finn had a moral dilemma.  Should he tell Miss Wat-
son the whereabouts of Jim, her runaway slave?  That is what Huck’s 
conscience, molded in Sunday school, told him to do.  But Huck got to 
thinking.”  He remembered the good times he had shared with Jim on 
the Mississippi River, and he recalled that Jim was more than Miss Wat-
son’s property; he was a friend.  He tore up the letter, deciding to protect 
Jim even if that meant he would “go to hell.”1  Huck thought he was dis-
obeying his conscience because he assumed the voice of conscience 
spoke in religious commands.2  Many readers, though, would conclude 
that Huck was obeying his conscience; it is just that his conscience urged 
him to act in spite of his religious beliefs.3 
 
 1. MARK TWAIN, THE ANNOTATED HUCKLEBERRY FINN 344 (Michael Patrick Hearn, ed., 
2001). 
 2. Mark Twain maintained that Huck was not acting on conscience, and disclaimed the concept 
of conscience.  See id. at 162 (detailing Twain’s revisions to the small pox story and its inclusion as part 
of his “Morals Lecture”); MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 767 (Victor Fischer, 
et al. eds., 2003) (introducing the small pox story in his Morals Lecture with the proposition that “in a 
crucial moral emergency a sound heart is a safer guide than an ill-trained conscience”); Fred W. Lorch, 
Mark Twain’s “Morals” Lecture During the American Phase of His World Tour in 1895–1896, 26 AM. 
LIT. 52, 59 (1954) (discussing Twain’s use of Huck to show “the power of early training to mould the 
human conscience”). 
 3. The distance between Huck, Twain, and Samuel Clemens’ respective reflections on morality 
and conscience calls to mind Wendell Berry’s observation that “[Huck’s voice] is not Mark Twain’s 
voice.  It is the voice, we can only say, of a great genius named Huckleberry Finn, who inhabited a 
somewhat lesser genius named Mark Twain, who inhabited a frustrated businessman named Samuel 
Clemens.”  Wendell Berry, Writer and Region, in WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 73 (1990).  
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Outside the domain of law, whether Huck’s decision was based on 
religious belief, conscience, or both, may make little difference.  What is 
crucial is that he felt obligated to help Jim.  Law, however, may relax its 
strictures depending on whether one’s action is based on religion, con-
science, or both.  Suppose Huck’s efforts to help Jim ran afoul of a stat-
ute against aiding a runaway slave and Huck wanted to raise conscience 
as a defense.  Would his claim sound in religious liberty?4  Perhaps not—
after all, Huck turned his back on the Sunday School norms of his reli-
gious community, and he thought his actions might even punch his ticket 
to hell.5  If not religious liberty, what about freedom of conscience?  
Some legal provisions, like the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause,6 speak in terms of religious liberty, and whether they cover non-
religious conscience claims is unclear.7  Others, like the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, provide legal exceptions for what seems like con-
science but not necessarily religion.8  Still others, like statutory exemp-
tions from requirements to participate in abortion,9 physician-assisted su-
icide,10 and capital punishment,11 seem to protect both religious and 
nonreligious moral convictions.  
 
 4. See United States v. Rycraft, 27 F. Cas. 918, 921 (D. Wis. 1852) (rejecting conscientious ob-
jection as a defense to a conviction under the Fugitive Slave Act for aiding a runaway slave). 
 5. TWAIN, supra note 1, at 344. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or the free exercise thereof.”). 
 7. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (suggesting that Henry David Thoreau’s 
conscientious objections were insufficiently religious to be protected by the religion clauses).  This 
position was unanimously reaffirmed in Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833–34 
(1989); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n one im-
portant respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free Exercise 
Clause, religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other 
strongly-held beliefs do not.”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (holding the same for a 
draftee who admitted to being an atheist).  But see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (inter-
preting the Selective Services conscientious objector exemption generously to exempt a draftee whose 
objection was based on nonreligious moral considerations). 
 8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2002) (permitting an attorney to 
terminate representation of a client who “insists upon taking action the lawyer considers repugnant”); 
see also id., Preamble, ¶ 7 (noting that in addition to the rules of professional conduct and substantive 
law, “a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience”). 
 9. Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2006) (enacted as part of the Health Programs 
Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45) (mandating that public officials may not require individuals 
or entities receiving certain public finds to perform abortion or sterilization procedures if it “would be 
contrary to [the individual or entity’s] religious beliefs or moral convictions”); Danforth Amendment 
of 1988, 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (part of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259) (clari-
fying that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 may not be construed to prohibit or require 
any individual or entity to provide or pay for abortion-related services); Coats/Snowe Amendment of 
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134) (specifying that federal, state, and local governments may not discrimi-
nate against health care entities that decline to participate in abortion training or abortions); Medicare 
and Medicaid Conscience Clause Provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(j)(3)(B), 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (part 
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33) (exempting managed care providers from 
requirement to cover counseling or referral for procedures that violate their moral or religious views, 
the first to exempt for counseling or referrals); Weldon Amendment, Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034. 
 10. Oregon Death with Dignity Act § 4.01, OR. REV. STAT § 127.885 (2012); Washington Death 
with Dignity Act § 19, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.190 (2008). 
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Legal theorists have been unclear about the relationship between 
religion and conscience and whether one or both should be eligible for 
legal exemptions.  Many who argue for a robust religious freedom simul-
taneously endorse liberty of conscience without clearly distinguishing be-
tween the two.  Indeed, sometimes they appear to deliberately conflate 
them.12  Some theorists contend that there are good reasons for protect-
ing a broad notion of religion but weaker reasons to protect conscience 
generally.13  Others suggest that the most convincing rationales for some-
times exempting religious conscientious objectors from generally appli-
cable laws do not extend to exempting those whose conscientious objec-
tions are not based on religion.14  Still others argue that it is conscience—
religious, nonreligious, or both—that is worth protecting.15  And some 
conclude that it is unfair to provide exemptions for religious conscience 
without likewise extending exemptions for nonreligious conscience.16 
These disagreements have several sources.  First, the Constitution’s 
religion clauses expressly protect “religion.”17  The drafters and ratifiers 
of the First Amendment, however, used religious freedom and liberty of 
conscience interchangeably.18  Many U.S. political theorists have contin-
ued this rhetorical tradition without accounting for the evolution of those 
terms through time.  The result is that many theorists speak the same 
language as the Founders but mean something different.19  Second, the 
 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (prohibiting state governments and federal agencies from requiring an 
employee “to be in attendance at or participate in any prosecution or execution under this section if 
such participation is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the employee” including “per-
sonal preparation of the condemned individual and the apparatus used for execution and supervision 
of the activities of other personnel in carrying out such activities”). 
 12. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 208–09 (2000). 
 13. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemp-
tions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2009); see also Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 325, 357 (2005) (concluding that “freedom of conscience can thrive only 
in rarified environments,” and that “the case for conscience seems to depend on metaethical objectiv-
ism”). 
 14. See JOHN GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 54–55 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Origins]. 
 15. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 65–71 (1996); Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment 
into a Statute with a Little “Conscience,” 1996 BYU L. REV. 645 (1996). 
 16. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 12 (arguing that religion should be “broadly defined” to 
include all “comprehensive conceptions” that are sufficiently “religion-like”); Frederick Mark Ged-
icks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555 (1998); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revi-
sionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 319–21 (1991); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Isn’t Special?, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend I; see Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314 (1996) (“For whatever reason, the Constitution does give special protection to 
liberty in the domain of religion, and we cannot repudiate that decision without rejecting an essential 
feature of constitutionalism . . . .”). 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
122 (1986) (“Conscience is one of the many . . . words . . . that have undergone a considerable change 
CHAPMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2013  9:59 AM 
No. 4] DISENTANGLING CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION 1461 
conceptual distinction between religion and conscience has remained un-
developed in legal theory.  This becomes especially apparent in argu-
ments both for and against protection of nonreligious conscience.  As 
Andrew Koppelman has noted, “there has been remarkably little expla-
nation of why conscience is a legitimate basis for objecting to the applica-
tion of a law. . . . [A]ssumptions about political theory, about morality, 
and perhaps even about theology . . . are rarely stated.  ‘Conscience’ has 
been something of a black box.”20  Finally, in the western moral tradition, 
“‘conscience’ has been a protean notion with different meanings for dif-
ferent people.”21  The result is a conceptual muddle.  Are religion and 
conscience the same thing?  Are they the same thing for purposes of lib-
erty?  If not, how do they relate to one another, and what makes them 
worth protecting? 
This Article distinguishes between two different human experiences 
protected by what is usually labeled liberty of conscience in U.S. legal 
theory: religious liberty and liberty of conscience.  The two overlap, but 
they are not the same.  One’s conscience may be informed by religious 
beliefs or not.  And one may engage in religious activities for reasons be-
sides conscience.22 
For purposes of distinguishing religion and conscience, this Article 
assumes a broad notion of religion.  Theorists put it variously, but many 
suggest that religion for purposes of religious liberty is a cluster of ideas 
meant to encompass the variety of beliefs and actions, personal and so-
cial, that respond to the experiences of birth, learning, failure, love, 
death, and the awe of being small in a grand universe.23  This is capa-
 
in meaning across the centuries, and that had at the very least a different nuance in the ideological 
frame of eighteenth-century Americans from what they mean today.”). 
 20. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 216. 
 21. Id. at 225; see, e.g., Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Four Conceptions of Conscience, in NOMOS XL: 
INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 13–52 (Ian Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998) (distinguishing be-
tween the following conceptions: popular religiously intuitive; culturally conditioned; Joseph Butler’s 
“reason”; and Immanuel Kant’s inner judge); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Jiminy Cricket: A Commentary 
on Professor Hill’s Four Conceptions of Conscience, in NOMOS XL, supra, at 53 (arguing that Hill’s 
conceptions are really just different perspectives on the same conception of conscience as the faculty 
of subjective moral judgment).  
 22. One interesting question this Article does not explore is whether those, or at least some of 
those, who engage in orthopraxy, but not orthodoxy, engage in the “exercise of religion” but not the 
exercise of conscience because they do not feel obligated to do so.  See, e.g., Lisa Miller, Kosher Athe-
ists? Obama Advisor Breaks with His Faith but Still Abides by Its Rules, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/kosher-atheists-obama-advisor-emanuel-breaks-
with-his-faith-but-still-abides-by-its-rules/2012/08/09/618b49b2-e23d-11e1-a25e-15067bb31849_ 
story.html. 
 23. See Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 981–82 (2010); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Reli-
gion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 42 (2000); see also 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 139–42 (2006) (proposing an approach that analogizes 
“the practice in question” to “undoubted religious practices, without prejudging whether some condi-
tions are absolutely necessary or usually crucial”).  For reflections on the limits of language to express 
the depths of religious experience, see WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 (2005) (“Courts need some way of deciding what counts as religion if they are 
to enforce [laws that guarantee freedom of religion].  Is it possible to do this without setting up a legal 
hierarchy of religious orthodoxy?  And who is legally and constitutionally qualified to make such 
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cious.  What is not religion, as I use the term, are those beliefs and ac-
tions that those who hold and practice them consider nonreligious when 
it costs them nothing to do so.  That is, beliefs and practices they 
acknowledge to be nonreligious when no legal right turns on them being 
religious.  This Article likewise assumes this notion of religion is worth 
protecting for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons—some of them 
religious, some not.24 
Because so much work has been done to explore the proper object 
of religious liberty, this Article focuses on disentangling conscience from 
religion and developing a discrete notion of conscience that is coherent 
and worthy of protection in its own right.  The Article proceeds as fol-
lows.  Part II analyzes two influential American accounts of liberty of 
conscience to explore how and why they have failed to distinguish be-
tween religion and conscience.  The Founders collapsed conscience into a 
narrow view of religion.  They used liberty of conscience to refer to the 
liberty to abide by one’s religious beliefs.  This rhetorical tradition was so 
powerful that even religiously unorthodox political radicals, like Thomas 
Paine, complied with it.  John Rawls, on the other hand, in whose shad-
ow much contemporary theorizing about liberty of conscience occurs, 
collapsed religion into conscience.  He argued for an indefeasible liberty 
of conscience that included “religion, morality, and philosophy.”  He nei-
ther defined the proper level of abstraction of conscience nor justified 
protecting religious beliefs and practices that are not driven by con-
science.  Neither the Founders nor Rawls justified protecting religious 
liberty and liberty of conscience (religious and nonreligious). 
Liberty of conscience and religious liberty emerged from the Chris-
tian intellectual tradition.  Part III shows that the tradition does not nec-
essarily merge conscience and religious obligations.  Many thinkers in the 
Christian intellectual tradition have distinguished between conscience 
and God’s commands—or what might be thought of by outsiders as reli-
gious duty.  They have, therefore, encouraged adherence to conscience 
on matters indifferent to one’s religious duties, as worthy of respect in its 
own right.  Accepting such a conception of conscience clears the way for 
Christian thinkers to endorse freedom of nonreligious as well as religious 
conscience.  This, in turn, promotes the possibility of an overlapping con-
sensus among Christian and secular thinkers on liberty of nonreligious 
conscience. 
 
judgments?”).  See generally James Boyd White, How Should We Talk About Religion?: Inwardness, 
Particularity, and Translation, 7 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 316 (2000).  For an argument that courts 
should be wary of establishing a religion by adopting a more or less “official” description of a religious 
belief or practice, see generally Winifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441 
(1998).  
 24. See Laycock, supra note 17.  This Article makes no attempt to defend the notion that religion 
deserves “toleration” or “respect.”  See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration 
or Respect?; 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935 (2010); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. 
COMMENT. 1 (2008). 
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Part IV draws on John Locke’s epistemology to propose a concep-
tion of conscience that is distinct from religion and coherent enough to 
support a legal right.25  Conscience is a universal faculty that applies 
moral knowledge to one’s past and future acts, a moral judge.  This Arti-
cle relies on a conventional, nontechnical conception of “moral”—what 
one ought to do.  This notion of “conscience” is consistent with, but not 
reliant upon, the notion developed in the Christian tradition.  While the 
notion is not novel, it is narrower than the conception of conscience usu-
ally incorporated into arguments for liberty of conscience.  With religion 
and conscience disentangled, conscience is free to become more precise 
because it is no longer doing the work of two.  This notion of conscience 
is still admittedly vague.  As a conception that may be useful for law, 
however, it has several attractive features: it is less vague than the con-
ceptions of conscience in most rhetoric about liberty of conscience, it 
comports with common usages of the term, and it is as precise as many 
concepts the law already uses to refer to internal states of mind. 
Part V argues that fidelity to conscience is worthy of respect be-
cause it promotes integrity and undermines the government’s tendency 
towards moral totalitarianism.  Both of these are good enough reasons to 
protect fidelity to conscience, religious or not, in at least some circum-
stances.  Having developed a framework for discussing and valuing con-
science as a general matter, the Article leaves to another time the diffi-
cult tasks of determining when the claims of conscience should override 
government interests, and whether the Constitution should be under-
stood to protect nonreligious conscience. 
II. TWO WAYS TO CONFUSE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE  
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Two conceptions of liberty of conscience that conflate religion and 
conscience hamper legal theorists.  The Founding Generation used liber-
ty of conscience to refer to the freedom to abide by one’s religious be-
liefs.  Even political and religious radicals like Thomas Paine used liberty 
of conscience this way.  By contrast, the foremost twentieth century U.S. 
political theorist John Rawls dissolved religion, philosophy, and morality 
into the conscience that was the subject of liberty of conscience.  Thus, 
the intellectual traditions normally relied upon to frame contemporary 
discussions of liberty of conscience collapse religion and conscience and 
fail to provide independent rationales for protecting both of them; they 
either favor religion or conscience by subsuming one into the other.  If 
we are to give religion and conscience independent meaning and value, 
we must look beyond the conceptions offered by the Framers and Rawls. 
 
 25. This Article uses “conception” and “notion” interchangeably to mean a version of a “con-
cept.”  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6 (1971) [hereinafter THEORY OF JUSTICE]. 
CHAPMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2013  9:59 AM 
1464 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
A. The Founders’ Liberty of Conscience 
Scholars agree that in “our founding era . . . ‘freedom of conscience’ 
dominantly referred to individual religious liberty.”26  Why would most 
Americans in the founding era have used liberty of conscience to refer to 
religious liberty?  After all, many Americans influenced by the Scottish 
Common Sense movement understood that conscience, standing alone, 
referred to an internal moral judge and not necessarily a religious one.27  
And Americans occasionally—but rarely—argued that liberty of con-
science should extend beyond religious concerns to nonreligious matters.  
The preacher Simeon Howard, for instance, distinguished between “pri-
vate judgment in matters of religion” and “the power to order and gov-
ern all [of one’s] actions that were not of a religious nature.”28  The latter 
he assigned to the “liberty to act according to [one’s] own conscience.”29  
Howard’s use of conscience was conventional, but his argument for liber-
ty of moral judgments, distinguished from liberty for judgments of a reli-
gious nature, was far from it.  This Section explains why Howard’s under-
standing was so unusual for Founding-Era rhetoric about liberty of 
conscience and puts a fine point on just how unusual it was. 
Most members of the Founding Generation embraced John Locke’s 
theory of religious toleration.30  Locke’s theory was based on theological 
 
 26. Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 901, 901 (2010) 
(emphasis added); see McConnell, Origins, supra note 14, at 1493 (“[T]he vast preponderance of refer-
ences to ‘liberty of conscience’ in America were either expressly or impliedly limited to religious con-
science.”); Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do With Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 911, 912 (2005); see also MILLER, supra note 19; JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 39 (2000) (“[F]or 
most founders, liberty of conscience protected voluntarism . . . the unencumbered ability to choose and 
to change one’s religious beliefs and adherences.”). 
 27. John Witherspoon’s Lectures on Moral Philosophy, which “espoused the Scottish Common 
Sense movement as the best solution” to “the troubled relationship of faith and reason arising from 
the study of Locke, Berkeley, deism, and Hume’s atheistic scepticism” and “the danger of ‘infidelity’ 
and atheism,” was “the first widely known work of American philosophy,” circulating from the 1760s 
onward.  JONATHAN ISRAEL, DEMOCRATIC ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHY, REVOLUTION, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1750–1790, at 451–52 (2011); see, e.g., JOSEPH BUTLER, SERMON I: UPON HUMAN 
NATURE, reprinted in FIVE SERMONS PREACHED AT THE ROLLS CHAPEL AND A DISSERTATION UPON 
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 25, 29–30 (Stephen L Darwall ed., 1983) (“[Conscience] is a principle of re-
flection . . . by which [people] distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions.” (em-
phasis added); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, Part III, Chap. III (1759) (refer-
ring to conscience as a “judge within,” an “impartial spectator” who reminds us that “we are but one 
of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shame-
fully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, and execra-
tion”); John Perkins, Theory of Agency: Or, an Essay on the Nature, Source, and Extent of Moral Free-
dom, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760–1805, at 137, 
149 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) (“Every human creature has a sense of right 
and wrong, ought and ought not, which are evidently intended to remind him of duty and obliga-
tion.”). 
 28. Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company in 
Boston, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760–1805, su-
pra note 27 at 185, 188–89. 
 29. Id. at 189. 
 30. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
346, 373 (2002) (describing the “broad agreement in postrevolutionary America on a Lockean concept 
CHAPMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2013  9:59 AM 
No. 4] DISENTANGLING CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION 1465 
principles, namely the protestant belief that individuals have the authori-
ty and duty to determine what is necessary for eternal salvation.31  Locke 
thought that coercing people into religious beliefs was contrary to Chris-
tianity32 and ultimately ineffective because only freely held beliefs led to 
salvation.33  This liberty of conscience favored members of protestant 
groups that stressed individual responsibility and authority on spiritual 
matters.34  Indeed, Locke excluded some Catholics and Muslims from re-
ligious tolerance on the grounds that some Catholics believed they were 
not required to keep their promises to non-Catholics or to recognize the 
sovereignty of an excommunicated prince,35 and some Muslims were po-
litically beholden to the mufti of Constantinople, and therefore the Turk-
ish Caliphate.36  Likewise atheists were deemed to be untrustworthy be-
cause they had no fear of eternal judgment.37  In a nutshell, freedom to 
abide by one’s conscience on religious matters promoted peace among 
competing protestant sects; they agreed that fighting about the means of 
salvation did nothing to promote salvation itself. 
Many of the colonial charters expressed this conception of liberty of 
conscience.  The charter of the Massachusetts Bay (1691), for example, 
provided that “there shall be a liberty of Conscience allowed in the Wor-
ship of God to all Christians (Except Papists).”38  Five other colonial con-
 
of liberty of conscience”); see also JOHN LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James H. Tully 
ed., William Popple, trans., Hackett Publ’g 1983) (1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, LETTER]. 
 31. LOCKE, LETTER, supra note 30, at 26–27, 35, 47, 48; see Micah Schwartzman, The Relevance 
of Locke’s Religious Arguments for Toleration, 33 POL. THEORY 678, 685–86 (2005); cf. JEREMY 
WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN LOCKE’S POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 81–82 (2002) (arguing that much of Locke’s theory of equality is inexplicable without its 
theological assumptions). 
 32. LOCKE, LETTER, supra note 30, at 25, 30.  
 33. Id. at 27, 28; see Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Main Argument for Toleration, in NOMOS XLVIII: 
TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 114, 114 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds., 2008). 
 34. The generic use of conscience to refer to the specific demands of the Protestant religion cor-
relates to the tendency of the age to conflate religion generally with “true religion,” captured brilliant-
ly in the satirical statement of Parson Thwackum in Henry Fielding’s 1749 novel The History of Tom 
Jones: A Foundling: “When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion, and not only the Chris-
tian religion but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of Eng-
land.”  MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, ENDOWED BY OUR CREATOR: THE BIRTH OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
IN AMERICA 14–16 (2012) (quoting Fielding). 
 35. LOCKE, LETTER, supra note 30, at 49–50. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 51 (“Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of humane society, can have 
no hold upon an atheist.”); John Locke, A Third Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in 5 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, IN NINE VOLUMES 414 (London, C. Baldwin 1824) (denying that “atheism, 
which takes away all religion, [has] any right to toleration at all”); see, e.g., COTTON MATHER, 
OPTANDA: GOOD MEN DESCRIBED AND GOOD THINGS PROPOUNDED 46 (Boston, 1692) (“[L]iberty 
of Conscience is not to be permitted as a cloak for Liberty of Profaneness.  To live without any Wor-
ship of God, or to Blaspheme and Revile his Blessed Name, is to be chastised, as abominably Crimi-
nal, for there can be no pretense of Conscience thereunto”).  Atheism did not gain much traction even 
in continental philosophical circles until the 1770 publication of Systeme de Nature.  See ISRAEL, supra 
note 27, at 648–54. 
 38. CHARTER OF MASS. BAY (1691), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES AND COLONIES 
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1870, 1881 (Francis Newton 
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS].  
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stitutions followed suit,39 as did a handful of colonial statutes.40  By the 
mid- to late-eighteenth century, almost all Americans conceived of liber-
ty of conscience as the right to act according to one’s religious beliefs.41  
Although Americans gave numerous reasons for religious tolerance, 
ranging from religion’s corruption of politics (and vice versa) to religious 
liberty’s economic benefits,42 “by far the most common argument, espe-
cially in America, and the argument most pointedly establishing religious 
freedom as a special case, was based on the inviolability of conscience.”43  
The evidence is extensive, including state constitutional provisions,44 
 
 39. CHARTER OF DEL. (1701), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 
557, 558 (“Because no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liber-
ties, if abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship: 
And Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits; and the Author as 
well as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and 
persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I hereby grant and declare, That no Person or 
Persons . . . shall be in any Case molested or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Estate, because of his 
or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice . . . .”); CHARTER OF GA. (1732), reprinted in 2 
CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 765, 773 (“[T]here shall be a liberty of conscience 
allowed in the worship of God . . . and . . . all such persons, except Papists, shall have a free exercise of 
their religion . . . .”); THE FUNDAMENTAL CONST. FOR THE PROVINCE OF EAST N.J. IN AMERICA 
(1683), reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 2574, 2579–80 (“All persons 
living in the Province who confess and acknowledge the one Almighty and Eternal God, and holds 
themselves obliged in conscience to live peaceably and quietly in a civil society, shall in no way be mo-
lested or prejudged for their religious perswasions and exercise in matters of faith or worship . . . .”); 
THE CONCESSION AND AGREEMENT OF THE LORDS PROPRIETORS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW 
CAESAREA, OR N. J., TO AND WITH ALL AND EVERY THE ADVENTURERS AND ALL SUCH AS SHALL 
SETTLE OR PLANT THERE (1664), reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 
2535, 2537; PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES (1701), reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, su-
pra note 38, at 3076, 3077 (same as quoted Delaware text). 
 40. One Connecticut statute was titled “An Act for securing the Rights of Conscience in Matters 
of Religion, to Christians of every Denomination.”  McConnell, Origins, supra note 14, at 1494.  An-
other statute, “The Carolina proprietor’s Agreement with proposed settlers,” provided for “liberty of 
conscience in all religious and spiritual things.”  Id. 
 41. See id. at 1493.  See generally Philip Hamburger, The Constitutional Right of Religious Ex-
emption, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992). 
 42. See Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Con-
science?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Beorne v. Flores, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 819, 823 (1998).  
 43. Id.  
 44. N.C. CONST. art. XIX (Dec 18, 1776), reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra 
note 38, at 2787, 2788 (“[A]ll men have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God ac-
cording to dictates of their own consciences.”); N.J. CONST. art. XVIII (July 2, 1776), reprinted in 5 
CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 2594, 2597 (“[N]o person shall ever, within this 
Colony, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable 
to the dictates of his own conscience; nor, under any presence whatever, be compelled to attend any 
place of worship, contrary to his own faith and judgment . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (Apr 20, 
1777), reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 2623, 2637 (“[T]he free exer-
cise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall 
forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of con-
science, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practic-
es inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.”); PA. CONST. art. II (Sep 28, 1776), reprinted in 5 
CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 3081, 3082 (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalien-
able right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and under-
standing: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect 
or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and 
consent: . . . And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, 
that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exer-
cise of religious worship.”); VT. CONST. ch. I, § III (July 8, 1777), reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS AND 
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state bills of rights,45 debates over state disestablishment,46 federal legisla-
tive acts,47 sermons,48 and private papers.49 
 
CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 3737, 3740 (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to worship 
ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding, regulated 
by the word of GOD; and that no man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious wor-
ship, or erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of his 
conscience; nor can any man who professes the protestant religion, be justly deprived or abridged of 
any civil right, as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiment, or peculiar mode of religious worship, 
and that no authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power whatsoever, that shall, in 
any case, interfere with, or in any manner controul, the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of re-
ligious worship: nevertheless, every sect or denomination of people ought to observe the Sabbath, or 
the Lord’s day, and keep up, and support, some sort of religious worship, which to them shall seem 
most agreeable to the revealed will of GOD.”); VT. CONST. ch. I, § III (July 4, 1786), reprinted in 6 
CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 3749, 3752 (same wording as earlier Vt. Const.). 
 45. VA. CONST. § 16 (1776), reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS AND CHARTERS, supra note 38, at 
3812, 3814 (“That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, 
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and violence; and therefore, all men are 
equally entitled to the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . .”). 
 46. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 21, 22 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006) (“The Religion . . . of 
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man 
to exercise it as these may dictate.”). 
 47. Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 
1774–1789, at 187, 189 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (asserting that it would be a “violence 
to their consciences” to impose military conscription on “people, who, from religious principles, can-
not bear arms in any case”). 
 48. See, e.g., James Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania: Letter VI, reprinted in 
EMPIRE AND NATION: LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA (JOHN DICKINSON); LETTERS 
FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER (RICHARD HENRY LEE), at 33, 35 (Forrest McDonald ed., 1999) 
(“James II when he meant to establish popery, talked of liberty of conscience, the most sacred of all 
liberties; and had thereby almost deceived the Dissenters into destruction.”); Levi Hart, Liberty De-
scribed and Recommended: In a Sermon Preached to the Corporation of Freemen in Farmington 
(1775), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760–1805, supra 
note 27, at 305, 311 (“Religious liberty is the opportunity of professing and practising that religion 
which is agreeable to our judgment and consciences, without interruption or punishment from the civil 
magistrate.”); John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable (1791), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL 
SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, at 1079 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1998); Samuel 
Sherwood, Scriptural Instructions to Civil Rulers (1774), reprinted in I POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
FOUNDING ERA, supra, at 373, 380 (“I desire that every man may think and judge for himself in reli-
gion, and enjoy all the sacred rights and liberties of conscience in full.”); Daniel Shute, An Election 
Sermon (1768), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760–
1805, supra note 27, at 109, 121 (“Civil laws, of right, can relate only to those actions which have influ-
ence on the welfare of the state; and to all such the subject may be urged by the civil authority consist-
ently with that freedom of mind, in judging of points of speculation, and that liberty of conscience rela-
tive to modes of worship, which he has a natural right unmolested to enjoy.”); Elisha Williams, The 
Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants (1744), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra, at 51. 
 49. Letter from George Washington to the Religious Society Called Quakers (Oct. 1789), re-
printed in GEORGE WASHINGTON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING 11, 11 
(Edward Frank Humphrey ed., 1932) (“The liberty enjoyed by the people of these States, of worship-
ping Almighty God agreeably to their consciences, is not only among the choicest of their blessings, 
but also of their rights.  While men perform their social duties faithfully, they do all that society or the 
state can with propriety demand or expect; and remain responsible only to their Maker for the reli-
gion, or modes of faith, which they may prefer or profess.”); Letter from George Washington to Bene-
dict Arnold, Sep. 14, 1775, reprinted in 1 The PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: REVOLUTIONARY 
WAR SERIES 455 (Philander D. Chase ed., 1985) (“While we are contending for our own liberty, we 
should be very cautious not to violate the Rights of Conscience in others, ever considering that God 
alone is the Judge of the Hearts of Men, and to him only in this Case they are answerable.”). 
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Arguments about liberty of conscience figured prominently in the 
framing and ratification debates over the First and Second Amend-
ments.50  Madison proposed several amendments touching on religious 
liberty.  Two were aimed at protecting the “equal rights of conscience,” 
one against the federal government and another against the states.51  
Scholars have suggested that Madison’s goal with the “equal rights” pro-
visions was to provide “the same safeguard of conscience to the non-
Christian and nonreligious” as to Christians.52  Another provision would 
have appeared in the Second Amendment, exempting from “military 
service” any “person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms.”53  The 
“equal rights” and “military service” proposals failed.  Madison’s other 
proposals became the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses.54 
The drafting history of the Free Exercise Clause may be the clearest 
evidence that some members of the Founding Generation thought there 
was a distinction between the free exercise of religion and the rights of 
conscience, but the history provides few details as to what that distinc-
tion—if any—might have been.  Several versions of the Free Exercise 
Clause that ultimately failed would have protected both free exercise of 
religion and the rights of conscience.”55  The House and Senate records 
shed little light on why that version failed.56  The “free exercise language 
connotes protecting action, where the rights of conscience is more vague 
on that score.”57  But, it is unclear why Congress declined to include both 
provisions.  Some may have thought rights of conscience may have been 
understood to cover nonreligious beliefs, something Congress did not 
mean to support.58  The most likely reason is that many believed rights of 
 
 50. For a discussion of the debates at the Philadelphia Convention and ratification over the pro-
visions that touch on religion in the 1787 Constitution, see generally Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses 
of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 496–524 
(2011); McConnell, Origins, supra note 14, at 1480–85. 
 51. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450–51 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see Esbeck, supra note 50, at 
531–35.   
 52. Esbeck, supra note 50, at 535; PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 444 (2010).  See generally DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 45–50 (2011). 
 53. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450–51 (year) (ed. Info); see Esbeck, supra note 50, at 531–35. 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 55. New Hampshire’s proposal would have prohibited laws “touching religion, or to infringe the 
rights of conscience.”  THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 
IN 1787, at 326 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941).  James Madison’s initial draft was: “The civil rights of none 
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, nor on any pretext, in-
fringed.”  I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (proposal of James Madison, June 8, 1789).  After debate, the 
House approved Fisher Ames’s formulation, which protected both the free exercise of religion and the 
rights of conscience.  1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 136 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972) (Senate Journal); id. at 159 (House Jour-
nal). 
 56. For a detailed analysis of the decision to drop “rights of conscience” from the Free Exercise 
Clause, see McConnell, Origins, supra note 14, at 1481–1500. 
 57. Id. at 1488–89. 
 58. Id. at 1488–91. 
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conscience to be redundant with free exercise of religion.  After all, “the 
vast preponderance of references to ‘liberty of conscience’ in America 
were either expressly or impliedly to religious conscience.”59 
Even Americans prone to religious radicalism used liberty of con-
science to refer to religious liberty.  By the Revolution, some Americans 
had come to believe that “the natural light of conscience” was a surer 
guide to religion and morality than conventional religious norms such as 
those derived from the Bible.  Thomas Paine, pilloried by evangelicals in 
the early nineteenth century as an “infidel,”60 argued that the “dictates of 
natural light” which are available to all through “reasoning, or the dic-
tates of their own hearts” demanded an end to the “wicked practice” of 
slavery.61  Most shocking of all to Paine was that some Americans ap-
pealed to Scripture to justify the slave trade and the institution of slav-
ery.62  Rather than arguing that slavery advocates had misread the plain 
meaning of Scripture (as many U.S. abolitionists argued in the antebel-
lum era),63 Paine asserted that slavery advocates should interpret Scrip-
ture according to the dictates of conscience.64  The “natural light” of con-
science, in other words, should govern one’s interpretation of sacred text.  
This may not seem radical now, but to argue that “natural” conscience 
should influence one’s reading of Scripture, rather than vice versa, ex-
tended conscience’s jurisdiction under prevailing religious views and un-
derscored its independence from revealed religion.65  Paine’s role for 
conscience was robust. 
In his later work, Paine argues, however, that following conscience 
is ultimately a religious matter; indeed, he relies on an entirely conven-
tional notion of liberty of conscience to justify his unorthodox religious 
views.  In The Rights of Man, he argued that liberty of conscience is not a 
matter of a state’s “toleration” of religious diversity, which makes reli-
gious freedom subject to the sovereign’s discretion.66  Rather, it is an in-
nate freedom possessed by each person to determine what acts of wor-
ship God requires: “Man worships not himself, but his Maker; and the 
liberty of conscience which he claims, is not for the service of himself, but 
 
 59. Id. at 1493, 1493–94 (giving examples). 
 60. Sarah Barringer Gordon, Blasphemy and the Law of Religious Liberty in Nineteenth-Century 
America, 52 AM. QUART. 682, 690 (2000). 
 61. Thomas Paine, African Slavery in America (March 8, 1775), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS PAINE 4, 4–6 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1894).  Paine may have drawn the metaphor of 
the “natural light” of conscience from the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose exposition of the 
role of natural conscience in Emile heavily influenced continental thought, and ultimately American 
thought, on the nature of conscience. 
 62. Id. at 4–9. 
 63. See MARK NOLL, THE CIVIL WAR AS A THEOLOGICAL CRISIS 31–50 (2006); Mark Noll, The 
Bible and Slavery, in RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 43 (Randall M Miller, et al., eds., 
1998). 
 64. Paine, supra note 61, at 6.  
 65. Here Paine was in debt to radical enlightenment thinkers such as Spinoza and Bayle who had 
been far more influential in Europe than in America.  See ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 451–52.  See gener-
ally JONATHAN ISRAEL, RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHY AND THE MAKING OF MODERNITY 
1650–1750 (2001). 
 66. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN ch. 1, 22 (London, 1795). 
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of his God.”67  Paine thought that guaranteeing liberty of conscience 
would lead many to reject the tenets of traditional Christianity and em-
brace deism, agnosticism, or atheism.68  Liberty of conscience for Paine 
was therefore liberty to choose one’s answers to questions about God’s 
existence and demands—questions about religion.69 
The reason few Americans imagined a place for nonreligious con-
science was surely that most of them maintained Locke’s Protestant as-
sumptions about the centrality of the individual’s pursuit of eternal salva-
tion, together with his suspicion of the untrustworthiness of atheists.70  As 
the intellectual historian John Marshall puts it, most mainstream enlight-
enment thinkers—to say nothing of those who maintained religious or-
thodoxy—thought an atheist had no “‘conscience’ to claim ‘liberty of 
conscience.’”71  For example, one of the Federalists’ chief arguments for 
the Constitution’s No Religious Test Clause was that a religious test 
would be pointless.72  An “Oath or Affirmation” requirement on its own, 
they argued, would be sufficient to pique the consciences of truly reli-
gious persons;73 a separate religious test would simply induce dishonest 
heterodox believers and atheists to perjure themselves by taking the oath 
because they lacked any fear of God’s judgment.74  No one thought reli-
gion was irrelevant.  To the contrary, they thought a Religious Test 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Paine’s hypothesis was proved by subsequent events: within the first three generations after 
the War of Independence, America had spawned an untold number of new sects and denominations, 
some believed to be consistent with traditional Christianity, others based on a deliberate departure 
from that tradition.  See generally NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN 
CHRISTIANITY 57 (1989). 
 69. Douglas Laycock has suggested this formulation of religious liberty.  See Laycock, supra note 
17.  
 70. See, e.g., MOSES DICKINSON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, AT HARTFORD ON THE DAY OF THE ANNIVERSARY ELECTION, MAY 
8TH, 1775, at 35 (Conn. 1755) (“It is absurd, to speak of allowing Atheists Liberty of Conscience.  Be-
cause he who professeth himself to be an Atheist, at the same time professes that he has no Con-
science.  For what Conscience can a Man have; who believes that there is no God, no moral Obliga-
tions, no future Rewards, and Punishments?”); MATHER, supra note 37, at 46 (“[L]iberty of 
Conscience is not to be permitted as a cloak for Liberty of Profaneness.  To live without any Worship 
of God, or to Blaspheme and Revile his Blessed Name, is to be chastised, as abominably Criminal, for 
there can be no pretense of Conscience thereunto.”). 
 71. JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE, TOLERATION, AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE 694 
(2006); see, e.g., Debate in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (statement of James Iredell, Jul. 
30, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 91 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
 72. See, e.g., Note, An Originalist Analysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1649, 1652–55 (2007). 
 73. See id., at 1655–57; Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 28, 1787), re-
printed in 4 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 639; Debate in the North Carolina Ratifying 
Convention (statement of James Iredell), supra note 71. 
 74. See Debate in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (statement of James Iredell), 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 55–62; Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution 
(Fall 1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 639; Oliver Ellsworth, Land-
holder, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 639, 640.  
Jews experienced a mixed bag: some appreciation from elites, mixed with anti-Semitism from non-
elites.  See generally William Pencak, Anti-Semitism, Toleration, and Appreciation: The Changing Rela-
tions of Jews and Gentiles in Early America, in THE FIRST PREJUDICE: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND 
INTOLERANCE IN EARLY AMERICA 241 (Chris Beneke & Christopher S. Grenda eds., 2011). 
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Clause was irrelevant, and true religion was all that mattered.  Some who 
could have articulated a basis for protecting nonreligious conscientious 
scruples, such as Paine, focused on what may have seemed to be the 
more pressing need of religious liberty.  Paine’s liberty of conscience is 
inextricably tied to beliefs about religion, not actions inspired by nonreli-
gious beliefs about philosophy or morality.  Others, like Thomas Jeffer-
son, simply defined the rights of conscience to refer narrowly to freedom 
of religious belief and not action.75 
The conventional use of liberty of conscience by radical thinkers, 
such as Paine, suggests a reason for its restricted meaning besides 
protestant theology and force of habit.  As a matter of political rhetoric, 
freedom of conscience, abstractly conceived, may have enabled those 
who held disparate religious opinions—including disparate Protestant 
theological doctrines—to agree upon freedom of religion generally with-
out emphasizing their doctrinal differences.  Promoting freedom of con-
science was therefore a gesture of good will, or perhaps a “guise of uni-
versalism,”76 towards those with religious disagreements.  Conscience’s 
ambiguity continues to make liberty of conscience a rhetorically attrac-
tive vehicle for recruiting support for a relatively narrowly defined ver-
sion of religious liberty.77  As the next Section suggests, the ambiguity of 
liberty of conscience has the same promise—and perils—for political 
theory. 
B. John Rawls’s Liberty of Conscience 
John Rawls has been the most influential U.S. political theorist of 
the last fifty years.78  His work aimed to justify a political enterprise be-
tween those with irreconcilable moral and religious commitments.79  To 
secure their cooperation, his theory of justice guaranteed their equal 
rights of conscience.80  Unfortunately, Rawls gave relatively little atten-
tion to the contours of conscience and its distinction from religion, mo-
rality, and philosophy.  His work blurs the line between the three con-
cepts, rendering conscience so vague that it could encompass virtually 
 
 75. McConnell, Origins, supra note 14, at 1451–52. 
 76. See MEYERSON, supra note 34, at 14. 
 77. See, e.g., Evangelicals and Catholics Together, In Defense of Religious Freedom, FIRST 
THINGS, March 2012, at 32–33 (generally reducing calls for liberty of conscience to liberty of religious 
conscience); Robert George, Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience, FIRST THINGS 
(Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2009/11/manhattan-declaration58-a-call-of-
christian-conscience. 
 78. See, e.g., SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 529 (2004). 
 79. See id. 
 80. There are important differences between A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism 
(1993), but for the purposes of this Article, the differences are more of a degree than of a kind.  
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  On the “discontinuities” between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism 
for purposes of understanding the relationship between Rawls’s theory and religion, see introduction 
to DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, RAWLS AND RELIGION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM at viii 
(2001). 
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any strongly held belief about anything, leaving religion with little inde-
pendent meaning. 
Rawls’s theory of justice is built on two principles: (1) “each person 
has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties,” and (2) “social and economic inequalities” should be equally 
available to all people and “are to be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society.”81  The point is to articulate the basis of 
agreement for people who hold “reasonable” “opposing and irreconcila-
ble religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.”82  Such “irreconcila-
ble” doctrines may be “comprehensive” in that they “include[] concep-
tions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, 
as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relation-
ships, and much else that is to inform our conduct.”83  As Rawls sees it, 
the liberal tradition of political theory, which includes thinkers such as 
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and himself, provides a set of political val-
ues that those with competing reasonable comprehensive doctrines may 
share.  The goal is a peacefully enduring pluralistic democracy.84 
In large part because reasonable pluralism is an empirical fact, 
“equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought” are essential as-
pects of a liberal society.  Liberty of conscience means the freedom to 
“honor” “fundamental religious, moral, and philosophical interests.”85  
Rawls usually uses examples drawn from the history of religious toler-
ance to elaborate the meaning of liberty of conscience, but he consistent-
ly maintains that liberty of conscience likewise extends to freedom of 
morality, philosophy, and thought more generally.86 
The central reason a liberal constitutional regime should protect 
liberty of conscience is to gain the assent of those who hold irreconcila-
ble, yet reasonable, religious, moral, and philosophical commitments.87  
“[R]eligious and moral obligations” are perceived to be “binding abso-
lutely in the sense that one cannot qualify his fulfillment of them for the 
sake of greater means for promoting his other interests.”88  Elsewhere he 
links the intractability of conscientious commitments, religious or nonre-
ligious, with the challenge of articulating a set of political principles that 
might be agreeable to those who hold irreconcilable reasonable compre-
 
 81. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at 5–6; see also THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, 
at 14–15, 150–61. 
 82. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at 3–4. 
 83. Id. at 13. 
 84. Id. at 3–4. 
 85. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 206. 
 86. Rawls does say that Hume and Kant’s moral theories are reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines, and Hume’s, at least, was not religious in any ordinary sense.  See introduction to POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at xxvii. 
 87. See Joshua Cohen & Thomas Nagel, Introduction to JOHN RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO 
THE MEANING OF SIN AND FAITH 5–6 (Thomas Nagel ed., 2009) [hereinafter RAWLS, A BRIEF 
INQUIRY]. 
 88. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 207; see also id. at 214 (“Moral and religious freedom 
follows from the principle of equal liberty; and assuming the priority of this principle, the only ground 
for denying the equal liberties is to avoid an even greater injustice, an even greater loss of liberty.”).  
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hensive doctrines.  At least some of those doctrines “introduce[] into 
people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting 
of compromise.”89  This “irreconcilable latent conflict” gives rise to two 
alternatives: “mortal conflict moderated only by circumstance and ex-
haustion, or equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.”90  To 
secure political society that mediates between competing comprehensive 
doctrines, “the principles of toleration and liberty of conscience must 
have an essential place in any constitutional democratic conception.  
They lay down the fundamental basis to be accepted by all citizens as fair 
and regulative of the rivalry between doctrines.”91  Those who hold 
“nonnegotiable” “religious, moral, and philosophical” commitments 
therefore commit themselves to liberty of conscience because no one 
who takes “religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of persons seri-
ously” “would gamble” on being a member of the majority, instead of 
the minority religion.92 
Perhaps because Rawls’s overarching concern is to explore how 
conflicting doctrines can coexist in a political society, he pays little atten-
tion to the differences between religion, morality, and philosophy.  They 
are all species of “conscience,” which he treats as the proper object of a 
right.  According to Rawls, all three species of conscience may affect 
one’s conception of the good.  Protecting conscience therefore promotes 
one’s “capacity for a conception of the good,” or ability to determine and 
change one’s mind about the good,93 and promotes one’s ability to de-
termine that the “relation between our deliberative reason and our way 
of life itself” is part of our “determinate conception of the good.”94  That 
is to say, liberty of conscience “is among the social conditions necessary 
for the development and exercise” of “the capacity for a conception of 
the good”95—the means of determining the good—and among the condi-
tions necessary for realizing that aligning one’s rational deliberation with 
one’s actions is a good in itself.  This elaboration focuses conscience on 
morality generally—the impulse to determine the good—and the ability 
to reflect upon one’s morality more specifically.  Rawls nowhere, howev-
 
 89. Introduction to POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at xxvi. 
 90. Id.  Rawls’s experience in World War II likely contributed to his conviction that any success-
ful political theory must offer a means of ideological convergence.  On the one hand, “the need for a 
theory of justice to take [religious convictions] seriously drew on his own personal experiences of reli-
gious faith” before the War.  See Cohen & Nagel, supra note 87, at 7; Eric Gregory, Before the Origi-
nal Position: The Neo-Orthodox Theology of the Young John Rawls, 35 J. REL. ETHICS 179 (2007).  On 
the other hand, the horrors of the war and the Holocaust made theodicy impossible for him; his reli-
gious faith shaken, he sought a nontheological solution for the political problem of irreconcilable reli-
gious and ideological beliefs.  See John Rawls, On My Religion, in RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY, supra 
note 87, at 262–63. 
 91. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, EXPANDED EDITION 461 (2011) [hereinafter 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, EXPANDED EDITION]. 
 92. Id. at 311. 
 93. Id. at 312. 
 94. Id. at 313. 
 95. Id. 
CHAPMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2013  9:59 AM 
1474 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
er, gets into the weeds on where religion ends and morality begins.96  Nei-
ther does he discuss whether his conception of liberty of conscience pro-
tects “religious practice”97 but not “moral” or “philosophical” “practice.”  
At one point, he states that “the strength of religious and moral obliga-
tions as men interpret them seems to require that the two principles be 
put in serial order.”98  It is unclear what he means by “as men interpret 
them” or what it means as a practical matter to put “religious and moral 
obligations” “in serial order.”99  Although “the principle of equal liberty 
. . . arose historically with religious toleration,”100 “the intuitive idea [of 
political liberalism] is to generalize the principle of religious toleration to 
a social form,”101 and, consequently, religious toleration “can be extended 
to other instances.”102  Rawls’s aim to promote “equal liberty of con-
science” surely counseled against focusing on differences of religion, mo-
rality, and philosophy; drawing too fine a distinction between them might 
undermine an argument that they deserve equal respect. 
Rawls’s purpose for enveloping “religion, morality, and philosophy” 
in the broader category of “conscience” appears to be to emphasize that 
comprehensive doctrines based on these concepts present equally 
nonnegotiable commitments to some notion of the good.103  The principal 
reason to protect them is instrumental: it is a prerequisite to convincing 
those who hold a plurality of comprehensive doctrines to enter into the 
social contract.  Additionally, Rawls suggests that conscience should be 
protected in its own right because the exercise of conscience—in the ex-
ercise of deliberative reason to form and revise one’s conception of the 
good—is constitutive of personhood.104  It is unclear, however, whether 
assigning a moral value to conscience creates a tension with Rawls’s 
commitment against privileging any specific moral theory (or theory of 
the good) in order to gain consensus among those of competing theo-
ries.105  Indeed, some comprehensive philosophies would hold that all 
 
 96. Daniel Dombrowski, writing on religion in Rawls’s work, must routinely refer to “compre-
hensive religious (or philosophical) doctrines” to capture the ambiguity in Rawls’s conceptions of 
comprehensive doctrines and their relationship to conscience.  See, e.g., DOMBROWSKI, supra note 80, 
at 3, 79, 95.  
 97. See also THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 207 (discussing “the liberty to examine one’s 
beliefs”). 
 98. Id. at 208. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 220. 
 101. Id. at 205–06 n.6. 
 102. Id. at 220. 
 103. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at 314–15 (“In the first [ground for liberty of con-
science], conceptions of the good are regarded as given and firmly rooted; and since there is a plurality 
of such conceptions, each, as it were, non-negotiable, the parties recognize that behind the veil of igno-
rance the principles of justice which guarantee equal liberty of conscience are the only principles 
which they can adopt.  In the next two grounds, conceptions of the good are seen as subject to revision 
in accordance with deliberative reason, which is part of the capacity for a conception of the good.  But 
since the full and informed exercise of this capacity requires the social conditions secured by liberty of 
conscience, these grounds support the same conclusion as the first.”). 
 104. Id. at 313–14. 
 105. Id. at 9–10. 
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forms of morality are harmful, and presumably, under those philoso-
phies, the exercise of conscience would not be instrumentally or inher-
ently useful.  To be sure, some religions or other comprehensive doc-
trines may have reasons internal to them for protecting religion or 
nonreligious conscience.106  These reasons may be helpful for the purpose 
of establishing an overlapping consensus to protect liberty of con-
science,107 but for Rawls, the commitments of comprehensive doctrines 
are irrelevant to establishing equal liberty of conscience behind the veil 
of ignorance because they are not equally accessible to all people.  They 
are not “public reasons.”108 
Liberty of conscience and its constituent species, “religion, morality, 
and philosophy,” as Rawls conceives them, are too abstract to form the 
basis for a right of conscience.  Rawls treats “religion, morality, and phi-
losophy” as synonyms; they add nothing to the meaning of conscience, so 
the scope of liberty of conscience depends on the scope of conscience.  
There are (at least) four candidates for what Rawls may mean by con-
science.  Each of these conceptions of conscience finds adherents among 
courts and scholars (usually independently of Rawls’s theory). 
First, and most narrowly, conscience might mean a faculty that is-
sues “religious, philosophical, or moral” commands.  Rawls urges that 
liberty of conscience is a prerequisite of liberal society because con-
science is “binding absolutely”109 and therefore nonnegotiable.  Rawls’s 
meaning is not entirely clear.  One possibility is that conscience issues 
commands that the individual may choose to obey or not to obey, but the 
individual has no say over the content of those commands.  Conscience is 
a blind dictator.  This would be in contrast to a voluntarist view of con-
science where conscience is governed by free will.110  A voluntarist con-
ception sees conscience as worthy of respect because it is an expression of 
an “unencumbered self” rather than because it is evidence of an obliga-
tion beyond oneself.111  By incorporating religion, philosophy, or moral 
beliefs into conscience, Rawls suggests that the blind dictator may be 
equally influenced by any of these sources.  They provide input for con-
science’s commands.  The point of conjoining them is that people should 
be free to follow the commands of conscience whether those commands 
issue from religious or nonreligious beliefs.  
 This is similar to the conception of conscience this paper later elab-
orates and defends as a basis for liberty of conscience.  The key differ-
 
 106. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEG. ISSUES 275 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013).  
 107. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 31. 
 108. See generally John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 
EXPANDED EDITION, supra note 91, at 440.  For a succinct critique of the requirement that publicly 
presented reasons be equally accessible to all members of society, see Gregory, supra note 90, at 198–
200. 
 109. See THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 207. 
 110. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 15, at 65–71. 
 111. Id. at 66. 
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ence is that this paper conceives of conscience as issuing commands on 
the basis of deliberative reasoning.  Rather than dictating blindly or be-
ing the epitome of an exercise of will, conscience gives a moral nudge in 
the direction that deliberative reason suggests.  This conception fails, 
however, to encompass the full range of liberty of conscience and reli-
gious liberty.  Because Rawls makes religion a subset of conscience, he 
implies that there is no religious belief or action that is not commanded 
by conscience that is also worthy of respect.  This would exclude religious 
beliefs and practices based on culture, custom, ritual, or love rather than 
a sense of internal obligation.  As Andrew Koppelman has noted, such a 
conception “excludes some claims that are widely recognized as valid.”112  
Would a Buddhist’s meditation qualify?  What about an Orthodox Jew’s 
yarmulke?113  What about exploring a religion without committing to 
it?114  Making conscience-as-internal-moral-judge the touchstone for reli-
gious liberty could leave many religious beliefs and practices without le-
gal protection.115 
Second, perhaps Rawls’s notion of “conscience” should be con-
strued more broadly to refer to what Martha Nussbaum calls the “faculty 
in human beings with which they search for life’s ultimate meaning.”116  
On this reading, Rawls’s point is that those for whom “life’s ultimate 
meaning” is religious and those for whom it is based on nonreligious phi-
losophy or morality ought to enjoy equal liberty to search for that mean-
ing.  The problem with this definition of conscience is that it is indistin-
guishable from definitions of religion.  It is difficult to imagine a notion 
of conscience that deals with life’s ultimate concern that does not amount 
to a common understanding of religion.117  Indeed, this is precisely how 
many theorists would have the Supreme Court interpret free exercise of 
religion in the First Amendment and how a number of Supreme Court 
justices have interpreted statutes that refer more narrowly to one’s belief 
in a “Supreme Being.”118  To be sure, this interpretation of conscience is 
broader than a definition of religion that favors one religious sect or one 
aspect of religion, such as theism, eternal judgment, prayer, or communal 
 
 112. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 222. 
 113. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 902 (“Some perceived religious obligations, such as 
daily prayer or wearing a yarmulke, are nonmoral, unless ‘moral’ is understood very broadly.”). 
 114. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see Garrett Epps, To An Unknown God: The 
Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 (1998). 
 115. See Koppelman, supra note 13, at 221–24; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25–26; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 
1, 27; David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769, 796, 826–34 (1991). 
 116. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF 
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19 (2008). 
 117. Koppelman, supra note 23, at 981–82 (“Religion denotes a cluster of goods. . . . No general 
description of the good that religion seeks to promote can be satisfactory, politically or intellectually.” 
(emphasis added)); McConnell, supra note 23, at 42 (“[T]here is no other human phenomenon that 
combines all of [the aspects of religion]; if there were such a concept, it would probably be viewed as a 
religion.”). 
 118. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1965); see also John Sexton, Note, Toward a 
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1066–67, 1075–83 (1978). 
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rituals.  But few theorists or courts argue that the Free Exercise Clause 
protects only the exercise of religions that can check a certain number of 
items off of a list of religious attributes.  Even those, for instance, who 
argue that religious liberty presumes the existence of God, rarely go a 
step further and suggest that religious liberty should only extend to theis-
tic religions.119  The most widely agreed upon definitions of religion for 
purposes of religious liberty are somewhat fluid, accounting for the di-
versity of human experience with what people take to be the divine, tran-
scendence, or mystery.  This is the meaning of religion that this Article 
has presumed for purposes of distinguishing between religious liberty 
and liberty of conscience. 
Precisely because this understanding of conscience overlaps the 
generally accepted notion of religion in religious liberty, it merely dupli-
cates, rather than solves, the difficulty of defining religion.  Andrew 
Koppelman has suggested that this difficulty may be more hypothetical 
than real; in practice very few cases turn on whether the claimant’s be-
liefs and actions were “religious.”120  And to the extent those claims do 
arise, the difficulty of defining a religion may be a feature, not a bug.  A 
vague notion allows an ongoing conversation about its meaning121 and 
suggests the inclusion of unusual or minority religious beliefs and prac-
tices by analogical reasoning.122  This conception of liberty of conscience 
does little, however, to determine what limiting principle, if any, courts 
ought to apply to give some definition to religion or conscience where it 
appears in the law.  It has the additional problem of failing to give liberty 
of conscience any independent role to play in our scheme of ordered lib-
erties.  That is to say, it fails to give any reason that nonreligious moral or 
philosophical beliefs or actions ought to be protected besides that they 
are similar, in some unarticulated way, to religious beliefs and actions, 
and it would be unfair to protect religious but not nonreligious ones.123  It 
gives no independent justification for respecting fidelity to one’s thought-
ful moral judgment per se. 
Third, Rawls’s conscience may refer more broadly to a comprehen-
sive philosophy.  How “comprehensive” does the system of thought have 
to be?  Perhaps this is like the position advanced by David A.J. Richards, 
that “the motivation for universal toleration must encompass all belief 
systems, religious and nonreligious, expressive of our moral powers of 
rationality and reasonableness.”124  Does this favor people who happen to 
be smart or predisposed to think about abstract notions such as reli-
 
 119. Paulsen, supra note 106, at 1160. 
 120. See Koppelman, supra note 23.  
 121. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Vir-
tues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010). 
 122. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 
139–142 (2006). 
 123. See Schwartzman, supra note 16. 
 124. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 138 (1986). 
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gion?125  Some people are remarkably “inarticulate” about their motiva-
tion for acts of moral courage.126  Just like the “ultimate meaning” inter-
pretation of conscience, the “comprehensive philosophy” interpretation 
solves none of the problems inherent in defining religion for purposes of 
law—it increases the concept’s circumference without defining its 
boundary.  It may even make the boundary more ephemeral by eliminat-
ing the limiting principle that the protected commitments must be about 
“ultimate” things.  Would environmentalism count?127  What about Secu-
lar Humanism?128  The intuitive answer to each of these questions may 
(or may not) be easy, but stating a principled distinction is hard. 
Fourth, and most abstractly, “conscience” could refer to freedom of 
thought generally.129  Rawls describes conscience as something that 
“bind[s] absolutely,”130 but perhaps it “binds absolutely” in the sense that 
it is constitutive of one’s mental life: cogito ergo sum.  Various members 
of the Supreme Court have written in soaring prose about the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of thought, mind, and spirit.131  The 
first such articulation may have been Justice Holmes’s famous dissent in 
United States v. Schwimmer,132 declaring that “if there is any principle of 
the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any 
other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who 
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”133  This seed 
blossomed into the Court’s holdings that the First Amendment prohibits 
coerced speech, at least on matters of politics and religion.134  The as-
sumption underlying these decisions is that coerced speech, contrary to 
the views of some early modern philosophers, such as Hobbes, Spinoza, 
and Locke,135 does, in fact, shape our minds.136 
 
 125. NUSSBAUM, supra note 116, at 172 (“A different sort of unfairness no doubt remains: such 
formulations reward articulate people and penalize those, equally sincere, who cannot give a good 
account of themselves.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 23, at 978 n.79. 
 127. See Grainger PLC v. Nicholson, [2009] ICR 360, EAT [361–64]. 
 128. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country 
which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, 
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others.”). 
 129. See, e.g., TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND (2006). 
 130. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 207. 
 131. Wallace v. Jaffre, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985); Woolley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 710, 706 (1977) (re-
ferring to the First Amendment’s protection of the “sphere of intellect and spirit”); Jones v. Opelika, 
316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942) (“[T]he mind and spirit of man remain forever free, while his actions rest sub-
ject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs of his fellows.”); Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of the 
human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom to express them.”). 
 132. 279 U.S. 644, 653–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 654–55. 
 134. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705; West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943) 
(“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends con-
stitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the pur-
pose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). 
 135. Ronald Beiner, Three Versions of the Politics of Conscience: Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, 47 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2010) (explaining that Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke held that “conscience 
pertains to what cannot be touched by coercion because the conviction of what is believed is inherent-
ly unshakable”); see also Opelika, 316 U.S. at 594 (“[T]he mind and spirit of man remain forever free, 
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Freedom of mind and thought, however rhetorically attractive, begs 
theoretical and practical questions.  What counts as mind?  Is the liberty 
of mind negative, as in the compelled speech cases?  How far does the 
liberty extend?  To matters of religion, ethics, and politics—or beyond?  
If this liberty is positive, as some theorists have argued, how does the 
government choose between different ways of developing its citizens’ 
freedom of mind?137  Given Rawls’s point—to protect those beliefs or 
thoughts that “bind[] absolutely”138—it seems unlikely he would have en-
dorsed a freedom of conscience that swept in all manner of thought.  This 
would expand conscience to include everything, and therefore nothing. 
All four of these conceptions run into a separate problem when in-
terpreting legal provisions like the First Amendment that expressly pro-
vide for the “free exercise” of “religion” but not freedom of conscience.  
Depending how one believes the Supreme Court ought to interpret the 
Constitution, this may pose no problem: one may simply choose to in-
clude nonreligious conscience rights within religious liberty because con-
science is worth protecting or because it would be unfair to protect reli-
gious but not nonreligious conscience.139  But this is not what the 
Amendment says.  Some theorists have suggested that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels this result.  This pre-
sumes, however, that religion, morality, and philosophy are in some 
meaningful sense equal, which theorists tend to assert rather than show.  
The Constitution’s text is a hurdle for those who would advance Rawls’s 
conception of liberty of conscience as constitutional law rather than im-
perative of political morality.140 
In sum, Rawls’s own work provides no conceptual tools to disentan-
gle religion and conscience for purposes of law.  Religion collapses into 
conscience.  The liberty of conscience that makes the most sense with 
Rawls’s overall theory of justice is the narrowest: it guarantees protec-
tion of those comprehensive beliefs that no one would reasonably forgo 
to enter into the social contract.  Perhaps ironically, Rawls’s greatest suc-
cess in the area of liberty of conscience may have been in persuading 
most theorists to embrace a generous understanding of religion and de-
mand that all religions be treated equally.  This may have had the collat-
eral effect of widening the scope of religious liberty but by making it 
more difficult to conceptualize a conscience distinct from religion and 
therefore may have made it more difficult to justify nonreligious con-
science rights.  Disputes over nonreligious conscience claims became dis-
 
while his actions rest subject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs of his fellows.”); id. 
at 618 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical 
government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind.”). 
 136. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke’s “Constitution 
of Freedom,” 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 393; see also Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 
97 VA. L. REV. 317, 319 (2011). 
 137. See MACKLEM, supra note 129. 
 138. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 207. 
 139. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 1355. 
 140. See, e.g., id.  
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putes about whether the claim was religious rather than about whether 
the conscientious objection was worth protecting, religious or not.  This 
was, of course, also driven to some extent by the limits of the constitu-
tional text. 
The forgoing analysis suggests two insights.  First, assuming the first 
interpretation of liberty of conscience explored above is the best reading 
of Rawls, it is unclear whether there are in fact any nonreligious compre-
hensive doctrines that would serve as a veto gate for someone contem-
plating the social contract (or overlapping consensus).  Rawls never 
elaborates on such an example.  His mention of Kant and Hume may 
come the closest,141 but it is unclear which beliefs or practices of a thor-
oughgoing Kantian or Humean would require special protection in ex-
change for entering the social contract.  Furthermore, as noted above, 
this definition of liberty of conscience would leave many aspects of reli-
gion and religious activity—those not based on conscience—totally un-
protected.  Second, none of the other possible definitions of conscience 
explored above give any independent reason to protect nonreligious con-
science other than fairness to those who hold religious-like beliefs.  But it 
is unclear from those definitions of conscience what makes religious and 
nonreligious conscientious beliefs so similar that fairness requires treat-
ing them the same.  Furthermore, Rawls gives no reason to protect non-
religious conscience where a society prizes religious liberty and con-
cludes that nonreligious belief is meaningfully different.  Yoking 
nonreligious conscience to the value of religious conscience creates a 
burden to explain how nonreligious beliefs or practices are meaningfully 
similar to religious ones. 
III. DISENTANGLING CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION  
IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 
Religious tolerance and cries for liberty of conscience emerged from 
doctrinal differences within the Christian tradition.  The Founders, en-
trenched in various permutations of Protestant thought and religious be-
lief, collapsed conscience into religion.  John Rawls, who rejected neo-
orthodox theology and a career as an Episcopalian minister,142 collapsed 
religion into conscience.  Does Christian thought (and its ghosts that 
haunt academic philosophy in the West) inevitably blur the line between 
the demands of conscience and the demands of God?  This part argues 
that it does not.  Beginning with the Apostle Paul, there are strands of 
Christian thought that promote fidelity to conscience even when it may 
be at odds with revealed truth.  The tradition, therefore, supplies grounds 
for respecting conscience per se—whether religious or not.  Theorists 
working within or committed to the norms of the Christian intellectual 
tradition need not reject the value of nonreligious conscience. 
 
 141. See introduction to POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, at xxvii. 
 142. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 90, at 195. 
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A. The Apostle Paul’s “Conscience” 
The Apostle Paul introduced the notion of conscience into Christian 
thought.143  Paul “baptized” a quasi-stoic conception of conscience that 
was likely in common currency in the eastern part of the Roman Em-
pire.144  Generally Paul’s “conscience” was a universally experienced 
awareness that certain actions are wrong.145  A conscience may confirm 
one’s sincerity of speech,146 declare one’s moral guilt with regard to past 
acts,147 or provide guidance about the blameworthiness of future con-
duct.148  Paul also suggested that the universal experience of conscience is 
evidence that each person has a “law within.”149  The Christian tradition 
has interpreted this function of conscience as a foreshadowing of God’s 
final judgment.150 
Paul also believed that a conscience could make imperfect judg-
ments.  In his view, there was no reason for Christians to categorically 
abstain from eating meat that had been sacrificed to pagan idols.151  Some 
Christians, though, believed that eating such meat would make them 
spiritually impure and their consciences forbade them from partaking.152  
Paul therefore encouraged Christians whose consciences were “stronger” 
to abstain from eating such meat out of respect for “weaker” believers’ 
consciences.153  This implies that conscience is not always a surefooted 
 
 143. The Hebrew Scriptures used “leb” (heart) in a way that was similar but not the same as the 
way Paul used the Greek “syneidesis” (conscience).  See J.N. SEVENSTER, PAUL AND SENECA 93 
(1961). 
 144. C. A. PIERCE, CONSCIENCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: A STUDY OF SYNEIDESIS IN THE NEW 
TESTAMENT 15–17 (1955).  For a comparison of Seneca and Paul’s use of “conscience,” see 
SEVENSTER, supra note 143, at 84–102.  Seneca and other stoics used conscience to refer to God’s 
voice inside, a voice that was a final judgment on one’s moral actions.  It was a source of moral 
knowledge, not just a judge that applied moral knowledge gained elsewhere.  See ANTHONY C. 
THISELTON, THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREEK TEXT 640–42 
(2000). 
 145. THISELTON, supra note 144, at 640; see also ROBERT JEWETT, ROMANS: A COMMENTARY 
558 (2007) (“Unlike most modern conceptions, conscience for Paul was neither the voice of God nor a 
guiding moral agency but rather the irrepressible knowledge one has ‘with oneself’ that an action is 
consistent or inconsistent with one’s ethical norm.”).  For a brief overview of the modern interpretive 
history of syneidesis in Paul, see THISELTON, supra note 144, at 640–44.  Some recent scholars prefer to 
translate syneidesis as “conscious” or “consciousness.”  See, e.g., RICHARD A. HORSLEY, ABINGDON 
NEW TESTAMENT COMMENTARY: 1 CORINTHIANS 121 (1998). 
 146. Romans 9:1; see JEWETT, supra note 145, at 558 (commenting on Romans 9:2, noting that 
Paul is “conveying the idea that [conscience] functions as an autonomous witness to the consistency of 
behavior and internalized norm”); see also 2 Corinthians 1:12, 4:2.  In the Book of Acts, written by the 
author of the Gospel of Luke, Paul refers to his conscience as an internal faculty that verifies his 
claims.  Acts 23:1, 24:16. 
 147. PIERCE, supra note 144, at 21–28. 
 148. Romans 2:9–16. 
 149. See Romans 2:15; JEWETT, supra note 145, at 215–17 (commenting on Romans 2:15).  For the 
notion that God writes the law on consciences, or “hearts” (the term in the Hebrew Scriptures that 
most closely mirrors conscience on Paul’s writing), Paul may have been drawing on Jeremiah 31:33.  
See ARLAND J. HULTGREN, PAUL’S LETTER TO THE ROMANS: A COMMENTARY 118 (2011). 
 150. See Romans 14:10–12; OLIVER O’DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT 294 (2005). 
 151. 1 Corinthians 8:7–12, 10:25–29; see JOHN FOTOPOULOS, FOOD OFFERED TO IDOLS IN ROMAN 
CORINTH 249–50 (2003); see also Romans 14:1–4. 
 152. 1 Corinthians 8:7. 
 153. See 1 Corinthians 10:23–33. 
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guide to God’s requirements.154  At the same time, however, Christians 
should respect and encourage fellow believers to be faithful to con-
science, even when its judgments are based on misinformation.155 
Paul never clearly states why fidelity to conscience, even erroneous 
conscience, is valuable.  He may have thought fidelity to even an errone-
ous conscience was worthy of respect because in practice moral obliga-
tions are difficult to discern, and one’s obligations may differ from an-
other’s.  One may have overlapping moral obligations to God,156 earthly 
authorities,157 family members,158 other believers,159 humankind as a 
whole, and all creation.  Each of these may bind conscience in different 
ways.160  How is a believer to prioritize the claims of these authorities 
when they conflict?  Who has the authority to determine whether there is 
such a conflict and how to resolve it?  Paul may have counseled fidelity 
to conscience because, though fallible and internal, it may be the clearest 
guide to resolving such a conflict.161  At bottom, Paul advocates relation-
ships built on faith in Christ and love for one another, not legalistic moral 
distinctions.162 
B. Addressing Conscience’s Fallibility Three Ways 
Christianity produced a plurality of intellectual traditions that each 
elaborate on Paul’s concept of conscience.  They all, however, maintain 
the tension latent in Paul’s thought between conscience’s fallibility and 
the importance of following conscience.  Christian thinkers address this 
tension in different ways.  To exaggerate the differences for clarity’s 
sake, the Catholic Church emphasizes the church’s role in moral for-
mation, and various protestant thinkers often emphasize the individual’s 
prophetic role against religious authorities or the importance of reform-
 
 154. See THISELTON, supra note 144, at 640 (“[S]omeone’s self-awareness or conscience may be 
insufficiently sensitive to register negative judgment or appropriate discomfort in some contexts (10:6–
22), and oversensitive to the point of causing mistaken judgment or unnecessary discomfort in others 
(10:23–27)”); SEVENSTER, supra note 143, at 101 (“The voice of conscience is not always the voice of 
God: the conscience of the ‘weak’ in Corinth was at fault.  It is only when it bears witness in the Holy 
Spirit that it may be called upon as a witness for the truth.”). 
 155. See SEVENSTER, supra note 143, at 98–99. 
 156. See James 4:7. 
 157. See Romans 13:1–7; Matthew 22:21; SEVENSTER, supra note 143, at 94. 
 158. See Ephesians 5:21; Colossians 3:18–4:1; Titus 2:1–10; 1 Peter 2:18–3:7; see also ELISABETH 
SCHUSSLER FIORENZA, IN MEMORY OF HER: A FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF 
CHRISTIAN ORIGINS 218 (1983).  See generally RICHARD HAYS, THE MORAL VISION OF THE NEW 
TESTAMENT: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS 64–65 (1996).  
 159. See Ephesians 5:21 (“Be subject to one another out of reverence for Christ”). 
 160. Romans 13:5 (“Therefore one must be subject, not only because of wrath but also because of 
conscience.”). 
 161. Cf. Romans 14:1–12.  See generally CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, ¶ 1789 (1994) 
[hereinafter CATECHISM]. 
 162. See HULTGREN, supra note 149, at 511 (“The one who is ‘weak in faith’ from the standpoint 
of ‘the strong’ practices what he or she does ‘for the Lord’ (14:6) and as a matter of ‘faith’ (14:22–
23).”); THISELTON, supra note 144, at 644 (“Freedom and ‘rights’ . . . must be restrained by self-
discipline for the sake of love for the insecure or the vulnerable, for whom ‘my freedom’ might be ‘their 
ruin.’”). 
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ing natural conscience through faith.163  As a general matter, both tradi-
tions operate with a notion of conscience that is separate, though interre-
lated with, religious obligations, and that is worthy of respect in its own 
right, whether religious or nonreligious.  This anthropology is entirely 
compatible with a concept of conscience that is theologically agnostic but 
that acknowledges the operation of moral thought and judgment. 
1. Conscience Reformed by the Church 
Building on Thomas Aquinas,164 the Roman Catholic Catechism 
emphasizes both the universality of conscience as the discerner of God’s 
moral principles and the need for conscience to be rightly formed by the 
sacraments and catechesis.165  The Catechism speaks of conscience and of 
the Church’s role in articulating moral principles in multiple ways.166  
Conscience is a faculty that “includes the perception of the principles of 
morality (synderesis); their application in the given circumstances by 
practical discernment of reasons and goods; and finally judgment about 
concrete acts yet to be performed or already performed.”167  The Cate-
chism combines with this definition more “intensely personal tones.”168  
Conscience is “a law inscribed by God . . . man’s most secret core and his 
sanctuary.  There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his 
depths.”169  “Hear[ing] and follow[ing] the voice” of conscience requires 
 
 163. In fact, of course both traditions include a diversity of voices within them, and both empha-
size moral formation and fidelity to conscience. 
 164. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 79, arts. 12–13 (Fathers of the English Do-
minican Province, trans. 1981) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. 
 165. For a succinct overview of how the different moral traditions within Catholic thought have 
understood conscience, see Charles E. Curran, Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition, 
in CONSCIENCE 3 (Charles E. Curran ed., 2004).  For a brief sketch of the means and goals of moral 
formation, see Germain Grisez & Russell Shaw, Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth, in 
CONSCIENCE, supra, at 39, 45–48; see also Richard M. Gula, The Moral Conscience, in CONSCIENCE, 
supra, at 51, 54 (“The obligation to follow one’s conscience presupposes that we have properly formed 
our conscience.”). 
 166. See generally Linda Hogan, Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II, in CONSCIENCE, su-
pra note 165, at 82. 
 167. CATECHISM, supra note 161, at ¶ 1780; see also ¶ 1776 (quoting the Vatican Council II, Pas-
toral Constitution on the church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes).  A scribal error introduced 
a second Greek word, synderesis, into an influential copy of a work by Jerome that resulted in a medi-
eval dispute over whether conscience was a source of knowledge or an act of judgment.  See ROBERT 
K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON 
AND STATE 52 (2010).  Aquinas concluded that it was an act for two reasons: (1) its use – a conscience 
is usually said to do something, and (2) its etymology—the latin “conscientia” can be broken down 
into “cum alio scientia,” which means knowledge applied to a specific case.  1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 
supra note 164, at Q. 79, art. 13. 
 168. Jayne Hoose, Conscience in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism, in CONSCIENCE, supra 
note 165, at 89, 91. 
 169. CATECHISM, supra note 161, at ¶ 1776 (quoting the Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution 
on the church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes); see also Gula, supra note 165, at 54 (“We give 
primacy to conscience and regard the moral claims of conscience as absolutely binding because in con-
science is where we meet God’s Spirit leading us.”); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF 
ETHICS 125–26 (1966) (describing the distinctive aspect of Martin Luther’s emphasis on conscience as 
focusing on “the experience of an individual who is alone before God”). 
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“interiority,” or the practice of being “present” to oneself.170  In the 
Catholic conception, conscience is not God’s voice, as it was for stoics 
like Seneca and Cicero;171 it is more like God’s microphone. 
In response to conscience’s fallibility, Catholic thinkers have tended 
to emphasize the importance of moral formation.172  “[A] well-formed 
conscience is upright and truthful[,] [and] formulates its judgments ac-
cording to reason, in conformity with the true good willed by the wisdom 
of the Creator.”173  The means of formation are “the Word of God,” “the 
Lord’s Cross,” “the gifts of the Holy Spirit,” “the witness or advice of 
others,” and “the authoritative teaching of the Church.”174  Rather than a 
faculty that operates by blind intuition, a well-formed conscience is in-
formed by the Church’s moral teachings and directed by reason, shaped 
by a lifetime of learning and practice.175  Of course, even Catholics devot-
ed to the Church’s authority as a moral teacher, however, may encounter 
moral dilemmas that pit their consciences against Church teaching.176  
The faithful Catholic is obligated to work through the quandary with “se-
rious thought, prayer, and all available means of arriving at a right judg-
ment on the matter in question.”177 
The Catholic emphasis on conscience’s universality contributed 
greatly to medieval and early modern natural law as understood by 
Catholics and Protestants alike.  If all people have reason and a con-
science and reason and conscience, together, issue moral commands, 
then the irreducible elements of those moral commands amounts to a 
kind of universal law.  As James Wilson put it, “[l]aws may be promul-
gated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us . . . they 
may be said to be engraven by God on the hearts of men: in this manner, 
he is the promulgator as well as the author of natural law.”178  The ques-
 
 170. CATECHISM, supra note 161, at ¶ 1779. 
 171. THISELTON, supra note 144, at 641. 
 172. CATECHISM, supra note 161, at ¶ 1783 (“The education of conscience is indispensable,” par-
ticularly in light of the manifold temptations for people to “prefer their own judgment and to reject 
authoritative teachings.”). 
 173. Id. at ¶ 1798. 
 174. Id. at ¶ 1785. 
 175. Id. at ¶ 1784.  On the reasons to defer to the Church’s moral teaching, see generally Timothy 
E. O’Connell, An Understanding of Conscience, in CONSCIENCE, supra note 165, at 25, 32–35; see also 
Hoose, supra note 168, at 91 (arguing that the Catechism represents a more authoritarian approach to 
the magisterium’s moral teaching office); William E. May, Vatican II, Church Teaching, and Con-
science, in CONSCIENCE, supra, at 95 (defending the magisterium’s moral teaching authority as con-
sistent with Vatican II). 
 176. See O’Connell, supra note 175, at 29 (“But note that [conscience] is not directly accountable 
to the Church.  No, it is accountable to the truth and nothing else.”). 
 177. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, U.S. BISHOPS’ PASTORAL LETTER ON HUMAN 
LIFE IN OUR DAY 30 (1968). 
 178. See, e.g., James Wilson, Lectures on Law, ch. 2 (1790), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 470 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall, eds., 2007) (“Laws may be prom-
ulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us.  They are thus known as effectually, 
as by words or by writing: indeed they are thus known in a manner more noble and exalted.  For, in 
this manner, they may be said to be engraven by God on the hearts of men: in this manner, he is the 
promulgator as well as the author of natural law.”); id. at 498 (“IV.  That law, which God has made for 
man in his present state; that law, which is communicated to us by reason and conscience, the divine 
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tion for natural law has always been how specific its commands are.  
What precisely does reason and conscience demand of everyone?  Is this 
an empirical or theoretical question—or both?  In any case, the Catholic 
commitment to natural law, perceived universally by conscience, pro-
vides further support for respecting conscience quite apart from religion. 
2. The Prophetic Conscience 
The unifying theme of the Protestant Reformers’ theology was that 
salvation was by faith in Christ, not by works or “the law.”  They empha-
sized Christ’s teaching in the sacraments and Scripture as the highest au-
thority for Christian doctrine and conduct, and they equated the medie-
val church’s ecclesiastical demands with the law that Christ had 
overcome; furthermore, they urged parishioners to follow their con-
sciences in light of scripture not as a means of salvation but as a means of 
faithful obedience to God.179 
As a theological matter, the doctrine of justification by faith had 
legs; the Roman Catholic Church has since endorsed it.180  As an ethical 
matter, liberating conscience from Church teaching (though maintaining 
that it was still subject to Scripture) put a great deal of pressure on the 
individual.181  For some the responsibility was too heavy;182 rather than 
liberate the believer from fear of failure, it multiplied the ways to go 
wrong.183  For the western church it was the germ of constant schism.  It 
meant no ecclesiastical hierarchy or system of doctrine was beyond sus-
picion; each individual must judge all moral and spiritual matters for 
himself.  Anyone may be a prophet worth heeding.  The emphasis on in-
dividual responsibility to follow Christ’s teaching as presented in the 
Christian Scriptures indelibly shaped western political and moral thought 
 
monitors within us, and by the sacred oracles, the divine monitors without us.  This law has undergone 
several subdivisions, and has been known by distinct appellations, according to the different ways in 
which it has been promulgated, and the different objects which it respects.  As promulgated by reason 
and the moral sense, it has been called natural; as promulgated by the holy scriptures, it has been 
called revealed law.  As addressed to men, it has been denominated the law of nature; as addressed to 
political societies, it has been denominated the law of nations.  But it should always be remembered, 
that this law, natural or revealed, made for men or for nations, flows from the same divine source: it is 
the law of God.”). 
 179. J.M. Porter, Introduction, in LUTHER: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 4 (J. M. Porter ed., 
2003) (“In The Freedom of A Christian and To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concern-
ing the Reform of the Christian Estate Luther develops the three major Reformation doctrines which 
serve as the foundation for his political thought: the primacy of Scripture as the word of God, justifica-
tion by faith, and the priesthood of all believers.  Simultaneously, he contrasts these Reformation be-
liefs with those of the scholastic world and the papacy.”). 
 180. See, e.g., THE LUTHERAN WORLD FOUND. & THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, JOINT DECLARATION 
ON THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION 9, 11 (2000), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_31101999_cath-luth-joint-declaration_ 
en.html. 
 181. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCE OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
358–59 (1989). 
 182. MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD 148–49 (2007) (discussing Kant). 
 183. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 150, at 308. 
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and practice,184 resulting in two related yet distinguishable conceptions of 
conscience within the protestant tradition, which I label the prophetic 
conscience and the Christological conscience.  The former emphasizes 
fidelity to conscience as fidelity to God against the claims of religious 
conventions.  The latter emphasizes the reformation of conscience by 
faith in Christ.  There are, of course, members of the Catholic tradition 
who are exemplars of these types.  Both the prophetic and Christological 
consciences emphasize the tension between the claims of conscience and 
some other religious norms—the norms of coreligionists or the demands 
of Christ. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., embodied the prophetic conscience that 
has shaped British and U.S. political discourse.185  His Letter from a Bir-
mingham Jail rejected the calls of white moderates to forgo civil disobe-
dience and patiently wait for the regular political process to bring an end 
to segregation.186  Instead, King exhorted Christian and Jewish leaders to 
join the civil rights movement, drawing on the examples of other reli-
gious communities throughout history, the commands of scripture, and 
the concepts of just and unjust laws articulated by theologians from Au-
gustine and Aquinas to Paul Tillich and Martin Buber.187  The letter was 
a forceful denunciation of “lukewarm acceptance” of the movement and 
“shallow understanding from people of good will.”188  It called moderates 
to “creative” “extremism . . . for the extension of justice”189 in the tradi-
tion of other “extremist[s] for justice,” such as the Hebrew prophet 
Amos, the Apostle Paul, the Reformer Martin Luther, John Bunyan, 
Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, and even Jesus himself.190  He 
could have also listed Catholics, such as Thomas More and Dorothy 
Day.191  In keeping with this long line of prophets, King’s conscience 
urged him to chide the religious establishment for failing to resist injus-
tice according to the demands of their shared religious tradition.192  Bibli-
cally, the prophet’s role was to call the people of God to renewed faith-
fulness.  The prophetic conscience calls one to faithfulness to God when 
 
 184. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 181. 
 185. See MICHAEL WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION (1985) (linking the Exodus story to the 
political history of the West). 
 186. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 12, 
1963, at 767, 769. 
 187. Id. at 769–72. 
 188. Id. at 770; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963–
65, at 47–49 (1998). 
 189. King, supra note 186, at 771. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Thomas More’s letters from prison are hallmarks of sensitivity to the competing demands of 
conscience and secular rulers.  See Thomas More, Letters from Prison, reprinted in CONSCIENCE 
DECIDES: LETTERS AND PRAYERS FROM PRISON WRITTEN BY SIR THOMAS MOORE BETWEEN APRIL 
1534 AND JULY 1535 (Dame Beded Foord ed., 1971).  For a well-known dramatic account, see 
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1968).  For an account of Dorothy Day’s role as a prophet, 
see STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE 230–31 (2002).  
 192. For a lawyer’s reflections on Christian conscience in aid of the civil rights movement and 
against the United States’s engagement in Vietnam, see generally the work of William Stringfellow.  
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it runs counter to the demands of one’s religious leaders.193  The prophet-
ic conscience decentralizes human authority, urging coreligionists to 
change course. 
3. The Christological Conscience 
The prophetic conscience stands at the nexus of religion and con-
science, where one’s perception of God’s commands, quite apart from 
the moral norms of one’s local community, become the commands of 
conscience.  By contrast, another Protestant theological tradition empha-
sizes the radical distance between natural conscience and the commands 
of Christ.  Bridging the gap—aligning one’s conscience with Christ’s 
commands so that one may obey both—requires faith. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran pastor imprisoned and killed by 
the Nazis for plotting to kill Adolf Hitler,194 exemplified and articulated 
the Christological conscience.195  While in prison, he drafted several es-
says that have been published as an Ethics.196 
Bonhoeffer argues that a properly formed Christian conscience may 
condone violating God’s moral law out of love for one’s neighbor.197  
Bonhoeffer nowhere expressly condones violating conscience, but he 
strongly suggests that there may be a tension between Christ’s commands 
and God’s universal moral law.198  Bonhoeffer’s thought proceeds from 
the conviction that God has redeemed humankind in Christ, making it 
possible for humans to be fully human.199  Christ’s incarnation, cross, and 
resurrection enable humans to take “free, responsible action.”200  Free, 
responsible action is a “concept of vicarious representative action”201 
whereby one may commit, as Christ did, to the “voluntary assumption of 
 
 193. As usual, Protestants were the not the first in the Christian tradition to articulate this posi-
tion.  See, e.g., Peter Abelard, Ethics, reprinted in ETHICAL WRITINGS 1, 24, 29 (Paul Vincent Spade 
trans., 1995); Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 17, 25 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) (quot-
ing Pope Innocent III). 
 194. See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Death of a Martyr, 5 CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS, no. 11 at 6–7 
(1945) (discussing why Bonhoeffer returned to Germany from his studies in the United States in 1939).  
The standard biography of Dietrich Bonhoeffer was written by his friend, editor, and brother-in-law.  
EBERHARD BETHGE, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER: A BIOGRAPHY (1970); see also ERIC METAXAS, 
BONHOEFFER: PASTOR, MARTYR, PROPHET, SPY (2010). 
 195. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Dietrich Bonhoeffer are two of ten twentieth-century Christian 
martyrs who appear on the façade of Westminster Abbey.  Jenny E. Heller, Westminster Abbey Ele-
vates 10 Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 22, 1998), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407 
E6DF1030F931A1575AC0A96E958260. 
 196. 6 DIETRICH BONHOEFFER WORKS: ETHICS (Clifford J. Green ed., Reinhard Krauss et al. 
trans., 2005) [hereinafter BONHOEFFER: ETHICS].   
 197. See BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 221. 
 198. See id. at 281. 
 199. Green, Introdution to BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 6–9.  See generally 3 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER WORKS: CREATION AND FALL (John W. de Gruchy ed., Douglas Stephen 
Bax trans., 2007). 
 200. Green, Introdution to BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 12. 
 201.  1 DIETRICH BONHOEFFER WORKS: SANCTORUM COMMUNIO 156 n.17 (Clifford J. Green ed., 
Reinhard Krauss & Nancy Lukens trans., 1998) [hereinafter BONHOEFFER: SANCTORUM COMMUNIO]. 
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evil in another person’s stead.”202  This entails taking “responsibility not 
bound by any law” to act to protect another’s “life necessities.”203  This 
responsibility demands a “willingness to take on guilt”204 in “an act of 
human heroic love (for one’s country, friend, etc.).”205  One is willing to 
take on the objective guilt of violating God’s moral law—for instance, by 
killing another—out of love for one’s neighbor, relying on God’s com-
plete forgiveness of sin in Christ. 
Bonhoeffer develops a nuanced distinction between “natural con-
science and conscience liberated by Christ”206 to explain how one may at 
once run afoul of God’s moral law and still be “acquitted by his con-
science.”207  “Where Christ . . . has become the unifying center of my ex-
istence, . . . [t]he natural conscience . . . is overcome by the conscience 
that has been set free in Jesus Christ, calling me to unity with myself in 
Jesus Christ.  Jesus Christ has become my conscience.”208  “The freed 
conscience aligns itself with the responsibility, which has been estab-
lished in Christ, to bear guilt for the sake of the neighbor. . . . Responsi-
ble action . . . is demonstrated precisely by the responsible taking on of 
another’s guilt.”209  No longer “bound by [natural moral] principles,” 
such as Kant’s absolute demand for truthfulness in the face of a threat of 
violence to a neighbor,210 the responsible persons takes on objective guilt 
“for [another’s] sake,” “wide open to the neighbor and the neighbor’s 
concrete distress.”211  Thus, Bonhoeffer can say that “[t]hose who act out 
of free responsibility are justified before others by dire necessity; before 
themselves they are acquitted by their conscience, but before God they 
hope only for grace.”212 
Like the Roman Catholic tradition, Bonhoeffer emphasizes that 
conscience, fallible, must be reformed to operate properly.  For Bonhoef-
fer the means of reformation begin and end with Christ.  Christian con-
science will lead one to take on objective guilt to allay a neighbor’s “con-
crete distress.”213  Christian conscience may acquit an act that demands 
God’s forgiveness.  This is not “Christianity without conscience,” but it is 
a Christian ethic that endorses violating God’s universal law for the sake 
of another without offering a legalistic justification for that violation.  
Rather, one relies on forgiveness in Christ.  How does one determine 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 272–73.  
 204. Green, Introdution to BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 13. 
 205. BONHOEFFER: SANCTORUM COMMUNIO, supra note 201, at 156 n.17. 
 206. Green, Introdution to BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 13. 
 207. BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra note 196, at 283 & n.138. 
 208. Id. at 278. 
 209. Id. at 279. 
 210. Id. at 279–80. 
 211. Id. at 279. 
 212. Id. at 282–83. 
 213. Id. at 279.  Bonhoeffer notes that Goethe articulated a fairly similar notion of counter-
intuitive conscience in Iphigenia, though without adverting to Christian theology.  BONHOEFFER: 
ETHICS, supra note 196, at 280–81.  See JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE, IPHIGENIA 58–59 (Meredith 
Oakes trans., 2011). 
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whether an act that violates the moral law is nonetheless consistent with 
free responsibility?  Perhaps killing Hitler is an easy case.214  What about 
killing a heretic out of love for the church?215  Bonhoeffer’s subtle, pro-
vocative, and sometimes bewildering account encourages Christians to 
form and follow a Christocentric conscience at odds with natural con-
science.  By endorsing fidelity to this conscience he at once reiterates the 
distinctive Christian conception of conscience as being fallible and there-
fore distant from true religious obligation but nevertheless worth re-
specting in its own right. 
IV. DEFINING CONSCIENCE 
This Part argues that John Locke’s notion of conscience—an inter-
nal moral judge that may be influenced by one’s moral communities and 
beliefs, whether religious or not—is sufficient to support a legal right.  
The following Part argues that this notion is worth protecting. 
 Although Locke’s theory of toleration extended only to religious 
beliefs and action, his Essay on Human Understanding gives a nuanced 
conception of conscience and its relationship to religion, education, and 
culture.216  Locke argues that “moral Principles” are not innate; they “re-
quire Reasoning and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind, to dis-
cover the certainty of their Truth.”217  Conscience makes moral judg-
ments, but it is not an innate source of uniform moral rules.  He alludes 
to Scripture’s testimony that God has “written” “Moral rules” “on [the] 
Hearts” of only a few.218  “[M]any men,” therefore—those who remain in 
the dark about God’s revealed moral law—“come to assent to several 
Moral Rules, and be convinced of their Obligation” “by the same way 
that they come to the knowledge of other things”: “Perswasion.”219  They 
may share “moral rules” with others because of the common “Education, 
Company, and Customs of their Country.”220  “[H]owever” people are 
persuaded, these “Moral Rules” “will serve to set Conscience on work, 
which is nothing else, but our own Opinion or Judgment of the Moral 
 
 214. Part of the purpose of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics was to justify his participation in a plot to kill Hit-
ler, notwithstanding his general commitment to pacifism.  See Clifford J. Green, Introdution to 
BONHOEFFER: ETHICS, supra, at 1, 14.  For a theological engagement with Bonhoeffer’s pacifism and 
attempted assassination, see generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER 
AND THE PRACTICE OF NONVIOLENCE (2004). 
 215. For a humorous fictional account of a young man who justified murdering heretics, among 
others, on the grounds of an extreme Calvinist belief in predestination, justification by faith, and the 
eternal security of the believer, see JAMES HOGGS, THE PRIVATE MEMOIRS AND CONFESSIONS OF A 
JUSTIFIED SINNER (1824). 
 216. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 
1975) (1690) [hereinafter ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]. 
 217. Id. bk. I, ch. iii, § 8, at 66.  For an account of Locke’s moral theory and its relationship to his 
epistemology, see NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JOHN LOCKE AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 134–48 
(1996). 
 218. ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 216, bk I, ch. iii, § 8, at 70; see Jeremiah 
31:33 (referring to Israel); Hebrews 8:10, 10:16 (referring to the Church). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
CHAPMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2013  9:59 AM 
1490 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
Rectitude or Pravity of our own Actions.”221  He rejects the view of con-
science as a source of universal moral law, or even a “Proof of innate 
Principles” because experience teaches that people hold contrary moral 
views: “some Men, with the same bent of Conscience, prosecute what 
others avoid.”222 
For Locke, then, conscience judges based on the knowledge one al-
ready has, whether that knowledge is based on revelation or not.  Jews 
and Christians have special moral knowledge through revelation and 
their consciences apply that knowledge, but everyone has a conscience 
that applies whatever moral knowledge they possess (people may discov-
er their moral obligations by reason alone, although the conscience is a 
not a source of that knowledge).223  He thinks this conclusion is consistent 
with Scripture and empirical evidence.  For Christians who know God’s 
will, conscience speaks with God’s authority (though it is not the voice of 
God).  For non-Christians, conscience nonetheless acts as a moral judge 
and thereby as a witness to the fact of moral duty.224 
This conception of conscience—as a universal faculty that applies 
moral knowledge to concrete situations—is obviously discrete from reli-
gion.225  Conscience issues judgments on past actions and issues com-
mands with respect to contemplated future actions.  Thomas Hill calls 
this the “core idea” that various conceptions of conscience “have in 
common”: “a capacity, commonly attributed to most human beings, to 
sense or immediately discern that what he or she has done, is doing, or is 
about to do (or not do) is wrong, bad, and worthy of disapproval.”226  
Conscience is not a source of moral law, but it applies moral 
knowledge—whether that knowledge is shaped by religious beliefs or 
not.  It is not God’s voice, as Cicero assumed227 and Jean Jacques Rous-
seau proposed.228  The moral knowledge conscience applies when making 
judgments includes whatever universal rules one may be able to discern 
plus the sum of one’s moral education.  This may or may not include be-
liefs about what God demands.  Christians believe it is a witness to the 
existence of God’s law and a foreshadowing of God’s judgment,229 but 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 11 (George W. Ewing ed., 
1997) (1695) (arguing, in a commentary on Romans 1, that the conscience is a witness to a universal 
“moral law” or “rule of right” but not the specific “civil and ritual part of the law, delivered by Mo-
ses”).  See WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 217, at 140. 
 224. Subsequent British empiricists elaborated on this conception of conscience as a universally 
experienced moral judge.  See, e.g., LORD SHAFTESBURY, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING VIRTUE, OR 
MERIT, bk. I, part II, § I, at 7 (David Walford ed., 1977) (1699); see sources cited supra note 27. 
 225. For the notion of religion this paper presumes, see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 226. Hill, supra note 21, at 14; see also Curran, supra note 165, at 3 (“Conscience is generally un-
derstood as the judgment about the morality of an act to be done or omitted or already done or omit-
ted by the person.”). 
 227. THISELTON, supra note 144, at 641. 
 228. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 274–32 (Barbara Foxley trans., 1993) (1762) (detailing 
the creed of the Savoyard priest).  See generally LILLA, supra note 182, at 115–31.  
 229. O’DONOVAN, supra note 150, at 294.   
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everyone may experience it as an internal sense of right and wrong.  
These descriptions are different perspectives on the same faculty. 
On a Venn diagram, conscience and religion would overlap, not 
overlay.  Religion may include beliefs that require no action, actions that 
require no moral judgment, and, as Bonhoeffer suggests, actions that cut 
against conscience’s “natural” or ordinary judgment.230  Conscience re-
quires no religious beliefs.  It is an exercise of moral judgment—whether 
informed by religious beliefs or not.  Someone with religious beliefs may 
come to a conscientious judgment about a particular course of conduct 
without consciously basing that judgment on religious beliefs, and a core-
ligionist may come to the same judgment by consciously drawing on reli-
gious beliefs.  And as the testimonies of King and so many others sug-
gest,231 coreligionists may come to strikingly different moral judgments.232 
This conception of conscience is coherent, unlike the notion of voli-
tional necessity developed by Harry Frankfurt and criticized by Andrew 
Koppelman.  Volitional necessity describes the predicament of someone 
who is wholeheartedly committed to a course of action and cannot do 
otherwise.233  Volitional necessity, just as it sounds, merges freedom and 
necessity; someone wants to want to do something and therefore is no 
longer free to abstain.234  The objects of this desire may, according to 
Koppelman, be “idiosyncratic” and “deeply unworthy.”235  What about 
the murderer whose conduct was compelled by conscience?236  For this 
reason, Koppelman concludes that this notion of conscience is “a poor 
basis for legal exemptions.”237 
Unlike someone in the grip of volitional necessity, one has genuine 
freedom to disobey his or her conscience.  Conscience does not compel; it 
judges and commands.238  Someone may want to violate conscience (alt-
hough that desire would not be morally justifiable).  Or, someone may 
want to change a conscientious judgment through education and practice.  
For Bonhoeffer this entailed conforming his natural conscience to 
 
 230. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.  
 231. See supra notes 185–93 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 711 (1981) (explaining 
that Jehovah’s Witness who enjoyed constitutional protection against discrimination in unemployment 
benefits had disagreed with another Witness about whether working directly on the manufacture of 
weapons violated “Witnesses’ principles”). 
 233. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 215–16. 
 234. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, The Importance of What We Care About, in THE IMPORTANCE 
OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 80, 87 (1988) (“[A] person who is constrained by volitional necessity” 
“accedes to it because he is unwilling to oppose it and because, furthermore, his unwillingness is itself 
something which he is unwilling to alter.”); Koppelman, supra note 13, at 234 (“This double unwilling-
ness is what defines volitional necessity.”). 
 235. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 236–37. 
 236. Id. at 225, 237. 
 237. Id. at 236.  Koppelman admits that some notion of conscience may be worth protecting, but 
he does not develop it.  See id. at 240–41.  He is clear, however, that there is no conception of con-
science that is a good substitute for religion as an explanation for Religion Clause jurisprudence.  See 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 131–44 (2013). 
 238. See Hill, supra note 21, at 14. 
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Christ’s conscience.239  And even where one accepts conscience’s judg-
ment, he may nevertheless choose to disobey and suffer its judgment of 
moral guilt.  Moreover, even accepting, for the sake of argument, that 
“volitional necessity” is a persuasive account of the human experience of 
conscience, Koppelman’s objection to it as a basis for a legal exemption 
is insufficient.  The conscientious murderer, or “welfare monster,”240 is a 
stock character from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pamphlets en-
dorsing religious intolerance.  As John Locke and Thomas Jefferson ex-
plained, liberty of conscience is not a license to harm others.241  The con-
scientious murderer was a straw man then, and it is a straw man now. 
This Article’s account of conscience also differs slightly, perhaps in 
emphasis, from Michael Sandel’s.  Drawing on Locke, Madison, and Jef-
ferson, Sandel notes that one does not choose the content of conscience’s 
commands.242  The content of those commands may be shaped by one’s 
experiences, but the commands themselves arise unbidden, without will, 
and perhaps without any obvious reason.  This view of the relationship 
between intellect, will, and conscience is unconvincingly static.  Locke 
knew that one’s moral judgments were the product of one’s education, 
culture, and religious beliefs.243  Aquinas considered conscience to be a 
habitual act that could be improved by gaining knowledge.244  A full-
blown epistemological account of conscience is well beyond the scope of 
this Article; it is sufficient to note that conscience, though it has a unique 
function, depends upon and interacts in complicated ways with every 
other mental faculty.  Faced with a moral question, one may choose to 
gain more knowledge or remain ignorant; one may habitually obey or 
habitually disobey conscience, quieting it.  Additionally, Sandel’s (admit-
tedly brief) account is insensitive to the ways that various moral obliga-
tions may result in divergent claims upon one’s conscience.  Law, social 
norms, religious beliefs, intuition, culture, the expectations of others, and 
love all contribute to one’s sense of moral obligation.245  In any concrete 
case, conscience may resolve competing moral norms in unique and un-
 
 239. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
 240. Koppelman, supra note 13, at 225, 237. 
 241. JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE ON TOLERATION 26 (Richard Vernon ed., 2010) (“Things that in them-
selves are harmful to the community in everyday life and are prohibited by legislation in the common 
interest cannot become legitimate when employed in a church for a sacred purpose or expect to go 
unpunished.”); see also id. at 43 (“As fathers of their country, may [civil rulers] direct all their efforts 
and intelligence to increasing the civil happiness of all their children who are not violent, unjust to 
others, and disloyal.”); Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted 
in RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 56–57 (Michael W. McConnell, et al. eds., 3d ed., 2011) (“[T]hat 
it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when princi-
ples break out into overt acts against peace and good order. . . .”); Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the 
State of Virginia, Query 17, 157–61 (1784), reprinted in RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 
44–45 (“The legitimate powers of government extend only to such acts as are injurious to others.  But 
it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god.  It neither picks my 
pocket nor breaks my leg.”). 
 242. See SANDEL, supra note 15, at 66–67. 
 243. See supra notes 216–22 and accompanying text. 
 244. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 164, at Q. 19, arts. 5–6. 
 245. See generally Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
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predictable ways.  But, just because they are unpredictable does not 
mean they are not subject to reason, further thought, and revision.246 
Most importantly, the conception of conscience advanced above is a 
useful tool for conceiving of liberty of conscience as a category separate 
from religious liberty.  First, it is coherent enough to support a legal 
right.  The perception of moral obligations may not be a crystal-clear no-
tion, but it is no vaguer than conceptions of mental processes that are in-
corporated in legal questions of scienter and purpose.  Second, this no-
tion of conscience is more precise than religion or conscience as they 
appear in many arguments for religious liberty or liberty of conscience.  
This Article uses a broad notion of religion for purposes of religious lib-
erty and courts have adopted a variety of tests and methods for deter-
mining whether a claimant’s beliefs and conduct are religious.247  As this 
Article argues in Part II, many theorists merge religion and conscience in 
their notions of liberty of conscience, which does nothing to advance a 
clearer conception of either one.  Third, this conception of conscience is 
administrable.  Under this conception, courts would not need to engage 
in armchair social theory to determine whether a claim for conscientious 
exemption was based on religion.248  That would be vital for establishing 
a claim for religious liberty but not a claim for liberty of conscience.  It 
might be relevant to showing that the claimant has reasons for the con-
scientious judgment—reasons based on religious faith—and that the 
claim is therefore credible.  But the same credibility could be supported 
by evidence that the claimant’s beliefs had been shaped by reading Tho-
reau without requiring the claim to fit into the conceptual box of reli-
gion.249  Finally, this notion of conscience maximizes human freedom by 
allowing for overlapping, but not concentric, areas of religious and con-
scientious liberty.  Instead of pushing the concept of religious liberty past 
the point of plausibility and running the risk that religious liberty will be 
watered down as a result,250 it introduces a second, overlapping concep-
tion that may be the basis of a legal right.  Starting with a generous no-
tion of liberty, as this Article does, means that adding conscience rights 
to religious liberty merely extends liberty.  Doing so may add liberty to 
 
 246. The next Part develops this aspect of conscience more fully. 
 247. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 
1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981) (“First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do 
with deep and imponderable matters.  Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a 
belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching.  Third, a religion can often be recognized by the 
presence of certain formal and external signs.”); Grainger PLC v. Nicholson, [2009] ICR 360, EAT 
[para. 24] (defining a religious belief to include a “genuinely held” “belief as to a weighty and substan-
tial aspect of human life and behaviour” that “attain[s] a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohe-
sion and importance,” and is “worthy of respect in a democratic society”). 
 248. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 23. 
 249. See, e.g., Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 246 (1965). 
 250. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 452–59 (1985); Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004) (arguing 
that “an enlarged definition of any right may invite limitations on the circumstances in which it is 
available”).  
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those whose conscientious judgments are based on religion, but it cer-
tainly extends the domain of liberty to nonreligious conscience. 
Religious liberty and liberty of conscience, disentangled, are differ-
ent concepts.  The reasons for protecting them may be different, and, just 
like the concepts of religion and conscience, may overlap.  The practical 
approach to securing liberty for one may not make sense for the other.  
Alternative mandatory service may be appropriate for accommodations 
for conscience (religious and nonreligious), for instance, although man-
datory alternative service would not be appropriate for laws that discrim-
inate against religion on their face.  The state interests that may justify an 
intrusion on one may not apply to the other.  Both rights, religious liber-
ty and liberty of conscience, should extend as far as the reasons religion 
and conscience respectively are valuable to society when balanced 
against society’s other needs. 
V. CONSCIENCE’S VALUE 
Theorists have debated for centuries whether conscientious objec-
tors ought to be exempted from generally applicable laws and, if so, un-
der what conditions.  This Article suggests that these discussions have 
been plagued by insufficient precision about the scope of conscience.  
Having proposed a discrete conception of conscience as a moral judge, 
this Part explores justifications for protecting conscience.  It does not ex-
plore which interests of the government might override those justifica-
tions in a given case nor whether and when the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment ought to be understood to protect conscience.  First, as 
many theorists have noted, protecting conscience promotes obedience to 
conscience, which in turn promotes personal integrity.  Second, protect-
ing conscience undermines the totalization of morality by the govern-
ment and promotes lawful avenues for ongoing moral debate and plural-
ism.  Undermining the government’s monopoly on morality may be 
especially important where the community agrees a matter raises morally 
grave questions but where members of the community give a wide diver-
sity of answers.  When one should participate in the taking of human life 
is the most obvious example. 
A. Integrity 
Theorists have long noted that fidelity to conscience is a form of in-
tegrity.251  Few have made the case for integrity more persuasively, nor 
 
 251. See generally George Kateb, Socratic Integrity, in NOMOS XL: INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE, 
supra note 21, at  77; Kenneth I. Winston, Moral Opportunism: A Case Study, in NOMOS XL: 
INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 21, at 154; see also, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 80, 
at 312–13 (explaining that “liberty of conscience” “is among the social conditions necessary for the 
development and exercise of” “the capacity for a conception of the good,” which enables us to “strive 
to appreciate why our beliefs are true, our actions right, and our ends good and suitable for us”); 
Smith, supra note 26, at 936–37 (“The point, in sum, is to avoid undermining personhood by injuring 
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made its implications for political theory more clear, than Hannah Ar-
endt.  Arendt was struck by “the banality of evil” displayed by Adolph 
Eichmann through the course of his trial for participating in German war 
crimes during World War II.252  Eichmann did not appear to be an inher-
ently evil person who performed atrocious acts out of malice or ideology.  
These acts were due not to “radical evil”253 but to mere “thoughtless-
ness.”254  “The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people 
who never made up their minds to be or do either evil or good.”255 
In The Life of the Mind, Arendt explicated a concept of integrity as 
friendly inner dialogue, a picture of the dynamic relationship between 
thinking, willing, and making moral judgments, and the temporary inter-
nal peace derived from fidelity to conscience.  Arendt explores two asser-
tions attributed to Socrates that present moral paradoxes: (1) “It is better 
to be wronged than to do wrong,”256 and (2) “It would be better for me 
that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and loud with 
discord, and that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than 
that I, being one, should be out of harmony with myself and contradict 
me.”257  For Arendt, thinking is a sort of inner dialogue in which humans 
experience a kind of two selves.258  To the outward world or society, the 
world of appearances, each person appears as one.  But in the absence of 
other people, each person is alone with his or her thought life, or con-
sciousness.  “[I]n this . . . case, I clearly am not just one.  A difference is 
inserted into my Oneness.”259  Arendt refers to one’s self-awareness as 
“the two-in-one”: a person is “two” when alone with his thoughts if he is 
able to “keep [himself] company” but always appears as one to others.260  
In fact, for Arendt, a person not only appears as unitary to others, but 
 
the belief-action integration that helps to constitute the person.  And that objective does not appear to 
depend on the nature of the beliefs that inform a particular person’s identity.”). 
 252. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
(1963). 
 253. Hannah Arendt, “Holes of Oblivion”: The Eichmann Trial and Totalitarianism.  From a Let-
ter to Mary McCarthy, in THE PORTABLE HANNAH ARENDT 389 (Peter Baehr ed., 2000) (“[T]he very 
phrase: ‘Banality of Evil’ stands in contrast to the phrase [] used in the totalitarian book, ‘radical 
evil’”). 
 254. HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND: ONE/THINKING, TWO/WILLING 4 (1978) [here-
inafter ARENDT, LIFE]. 
 255. Id. at 180.   
 256. Id. at 181.  Arendt argues that this first assertion only makes sense following the presupposi-
tion that Socrates is “in love with wisdom and in need of thinking about everything and examining 
everything,” as opposed to a life of action, and he would therefore prefer to suffer wrong than to do 
wrong.  Id. at 182. 
 257. Id. at 181 (quoting Plato’s Gorgias).  Most translators omit “being one,” perhaps, Arendt 
suggests, because it implies a paradox: “Socrates talks of being one and therefore not being able to risk 
getting out of harmony with himself.  But nothing that is identical with itself, truly and absolutely One, 
as A is A, can be either in or out of harmony with itself; you always need at least two tones to produce 
a harmonious sound.”  Arendt believes, therefore, that the omission of “being one” rests on a misun-
derstanding of Socrates’ assertion.  Id. at 183.  For an account of conscience in the Crito and Apology, 
see generally Kateb, supra note 251. 
 258. ARENDT, LIFE, supra note 254, at 185. 
 259. Id. at 183. 
 260. Id. at 185. 
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their presence effectively brings an end to the thinker’s internal duality: 
“when he is called by his name back into the world of appearances, 
where he is always One, it is as though the two into which the thinking 
process had split him clapped together again.”261  Arendt is unclear why a 
person loses the internal duality around others; perhaps because society 
draws one’s focus outside oneself.  This caveat seems unnecessary, and 
there is no reason why her explication of the inner dialogue could not ex-
tend to someone who may be in society, and yet may be thoughtful, as 
though alone.262 
The notion of the inner dialogue supplies an answer to Socrates’ 
moral paradoxes.  To be in harmony with oneself is to “be consistent 
with oneself,” as opposed to being one’s constant adversary.263  Inner 
harmony is better than the inner discord of constant bickering.  As a cor-
ollary, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong because, in the end, 
one must live with oneself, and “who would want to be the friend of and 
have to live together with a murderer?  Not even another murderer.”264  
By contrast, integrity is a dialogue with oneself as a friend, not an oppo-
nent. 
To deepen this account of integrity, Arendt next considers a Socrat-
ic story she believes to be about conscience.265 
It is the end of the dialogue, the moment of going home.  [Socrates] 
tells Hippias, who has shown himself to be an especially thickhead-
ed partner, how “blissfully fortunate” he is in comparison with poor 
Socrates, who at home is awaited by a very obnoxious fellow who 
always cross-examines him.  “He is a close relative and lives in the 
same house.”266 
On Arendt’s reading, the “obnoxious fellow” who awaits Socrates is 
himself.  Socrates cannot avoid this cross-examination, while Hippias 
when alone, though conscious, is relatively thoughtless.  Socrates’ insist-
ence on not contradicting himself means that the person awaiting him, 
though pesky, “is a kind of friend.”267  Arendt contrasts those who en-
gage in friendly dialogue with themselves with “base people” who are “at 
variance with themselves” and “wicked men” who “avoid their own 
company,” and whose “soul is in rebellion against itself.”268  This kind of 
self-argument is a form of madness.269 
According to Arendt, “[l]ater times have given the fellow who 
awaits Socrates in his home the name of ‘conscience.’  Before its tribu-
 
 261. Id.  
 262. Thank you to Steve Smith for directing my attention to this point.  
 263. See ARENDT, LIFE, supra note 254, at 186. 
 264. Id. at 188. 
 265. Id. (citing PLATO, HIPPIAS MAJOR (Paul Woodruff trans., 1982)). 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. at 189. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. (interpreting Richard III’s various experiences alone and in company as a form of 
madness). 
CHAPMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2013  9:59 AM 
No. 4] DISENTANGLING CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION 1497 
nal . . . we have to appear and give account of ourselves.”270  She 
acknowledges that the “accustomed” use of the term conscience implies 
a moral command within271 and adopts a slightly different notion: the 
code of conduct that one must not violate if one is to “live at peace” with 
oneself.  Conscience is not thinking per se but a “moral side effect”272 of 
the inner dialogue between friends.  It is the knowledge that the friend 
awaits.  Conscience counsels one to “take care not to do anything that 
would make it impossible for the two-in-one to be friends and live in 
harmony.”273  Conscience is deeply personal.  The thinker thus does not 
base his or her actions on “the usual rules, recognized by multitudes and 
agreed upon by society, but whether [she] shall be able to live with [her-
self] in peace when the time has come to think about [her] deeds and 
words.”274 
Arendt distinguishes between conscience and judgment.  Con-
science is the reminder that there is a nag waiting at home to engage in 
dialogue before and after the judge has done its work.  In turn, whether 
that dialogue will be the warm conversation of friendship or the madden-
ing contest of adversaries may very well depend on the quality and con-
tent of the thinker’s judgment.  In the terms used by this Article, con-
science judges on the basis of the conclusions one has reached, and 
expects to reach again, in the internal dialogue.  Conscience turns reflec-
tion, the internal dialogue, into a directive that one may obey or disobey.  
This judgment feeds into the terms of the ongoing dialogue.  Fidelity to 
this judgment is a form of integrity because it quiets the internal critic, at 
least for a time, allowing one’s thoughts in solitude to be the dialogue of 
friends.   
This account of conscience as the faculty that leads to moral judg-
ments on the basis of reflection nicely describes Huckleberry Finn’s deci-
sion-making process.  Huck’s conscience initially instructed him to tell 
Miss Watson where Jim, her runaway slave, was being held.275  In fact he 
wrote a letter to that effect.276  Huck had been conditioned by social 
norms, some of them religious, that condoned slavery.  After writing the 
letter, he felt he was able to pray again without having to conceal his de-
sire to save Jim.277  Then memories of Jim washed over him.  As Huck 
says, 
somehow I couldn’t seem to strike no places to harden me against 
him, but only the other kind.  I’d see him standing my watch on top 
of his’n, stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see 
him . . . always call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he 
 
 270. Id. at 190. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 192. 
 273. Id. at 191. 
 274. Id.  
 275. TWAIN, supra note 1, at 341–42 
 276. Id. at 343. 
 277. Id. 
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could think of for me, and how good he always was; and at last I 
struck the time I saved him by telling the men we had small-pox 
aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old 
Jim ever had in the world, and the only one he’s got now; and then I 
happened to look around, and see that paper.  It was a close place.  
I took it up, and held it in my hand.  I was a trembling, because I’d 
got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it.  I stud-
ied a minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself: 
“All right, then, I’ll go to hell” – and tore it up.278 
It was only after this reflection and judgment that Huck was able to 
“shove[] the whole thing out of [his] head; and said [he] would take up 
wickedness again, which was in [his] line, being brung up to it, and the 
other warn’t.”279  The reader sees the irony in Huck’s topsy-turvy moral 
notions, but the point is clear: Huck could not be at peace with himself, 
to live with integrity, without helping Jim escape.  His conscience, as this 
Article uses the term, forbade him from returning Jim to slavery, and he 
chose to obey.  To say that liberty of conscience promotes integrity 
means that, in the best instances, liberty of conscience promotes this sort 
of reflection and fidelity to this sort of selfless moral judgment. 
Why would a government choose to protect this form of integrity?  
Does it require the government to hold that morality is objective rather 
than “conventional,” subjective, or even a sham?280  Steven Smith has 
suggested that a “sovereign” would protect liberty of conscience only 
when the sovereign believed morality is objective—or at least conven-
tional—and that personal integrity (Smith uses the term “authenticity”) 
is inherently valuable.281  In my judgment, Smith oversimplifies the posi-
tion toward morality and the law that the sovereign in a pluralistic repub-
lic like the United States may take.  Such a society need not depend upon 
or endorse any particular view of morality; each piece of legislation may 
be based on a different form of moral reasoning or none at all.  And, 
most importantly, the government need not adopt a position on whether 
personal morality is objective; on this it may remain agnostic.  I agree 
with Smith that in order to protect liberty of conscience for the purpose 
of promoting personal integrity, the government must value personal in-
tegrity, but it may do so for a wide range of reasons that have nothing to 
do with the objective value of personal integrity—reasons sounding per-
haps in the value of political compromise, or, more weightily, in friend-
ship among those who experience the commands of conscience generally, 
even if their consciences disagree about particulars. 
 
 278. Id. at 344. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See generally Smith, supra note 13. 
 281. See id. at 357–58. 
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B. Tyranny 
Protecting personal integrity is a hedge against the government’s 
moral tyranny.  Although John Rawls’s theory fails to protect religious 
beliefs and actions that are not based on conscience, it provides a strong 
political justification for protecting conscience.  As discussed above, 
Rawls argues that conscientious judgments, whether religious or nonreli-
gious, should be protected because otherwise citizens would be unwilling 
to engage in liberal society.282  Put differently, citizens would be unwilling 
to sign the social contract without a guarantee of liberty of conscience 
because their conscientious judgments are nonnegotiable.  With the im-
portance of conscience for personal integrity as a background fact, liber-
ty of conscience may be seen as the lynchpin of liberal society.  At the 
individual level, it allows agreement with oneself, and at the social level, 
it enables agreement between people with different moral commitments.  
Government by consent assumes people who are able and willing to give 
consent.  The ability and willingness of people to consent to external 
government are both enhanced by ensuring their personal sovereignty on 
matters of deep moral conviction. 
As a practical matter, liberty of conscience may advance democratic 
deliberation.  It eliminates some disputes over moral differences that 
might otherwise monopolize the public life of a pluralistic society.  This 
leaves objectors and their opponents more resources—time, money, po-
litical capital—to debate (and to collaborate on) other important mat-
ters.  It may also generate social trust between groups that may otherwise 
be suspicious of one another. 
Protecting liberty of conscience also limits the government’s preten-
sions to absolute moral authority.  Liberty of conscience enables noncon-
formist moral thought that undermines moral tyranny.  The govern-
ment’s moral monopoly may be good in many circumstances.  The 
government regularly (and quite rightly) decides that certain moral posi-
tions are off the table.  Virtually no one in the liberal tradition would tol-
erate physical abuse of another person under the banner of liberty of 
conscience.  The government must set moral limits. 
The government will almost invariably set limits that fly in the face 
of some peoples’ consciences.  This may give rise to civil disobedience on 
a small or large scale.  Mass civil disobedience has an important place in 
political history and theory, and it can be particularly effective at jarring 
a morally apathetic society into taking notice and making important 
changes.  It is quite likely that laws requiring one to violate conscience 
more frequently result in quiet acquiescence.  The power of authoritative 
commands to shape an individual’s thought and conscientious judgment 
is probably impossible to gauge.  Small amounts of personal disintegra-
tion are easy to tolerate—or even ignore—when the costs of avoiding 
them are so great.  In petty cases, society should probably accept such 
 
 282. See supra Part II.B. 
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personal disintegration and expect eventual reintegration along majority 
lines.  The challenge is to not mistake the grand cases for the petty.283 
Protecting conscience hedges against the chance that the majority 
has come to the wrong conclusion by promoting minority thought and 
practice that keeps alternatives alive.  It allows majority decisions to be 
provisional and allows the persuasiveness of minority speech to be aided 
by the persuasiveness of minority action.  Alternatively, by taking a mi-
nority moral position off the table, the government resists revising its po-
sition.  Conscientious exemptions for those who disagree with prevailing 
norms prolong internal and national dialogues over contested moral is-
sues.  This may lead to better public understandings and decisions on 
morally novel issues such as the best use of new technology or morally 
profound issues such as those related to killing—abortion, euthanasia, 
capital punishment, war, and the like.284 
Somewhat by contrast, Arendt argues that conscience matters most 
in “special emergencies” or “boundary situations.”285  Her reflections fo-
cus on when conscientious objectors may show society its flaws “when 
the stakes are on the table,” “when everybody is swept away unthinking-
ly by what everybody else does and believes in.”286  Then “those who 
think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join . . . is conspic-
uous and thereby becomes a kind of action.”287  She does not appear to 
consider the possibility of protecting conscience as a hedge against the 
development of “special emergencies.” 
There is no reason to think that conscientious judgments about se-
rious moral issues divide neatly along lines of religious belief.  Liberty of 
conscience protects the integrity of those, religious and nonreligious, who 
take a minority position.  More importantly from society’s standpoint, 
though, liberty of conscience undermines the government’s tendency to-
ward a moral totalitarianism that society may eventually regret.  When 
society promotes Eichmanns and kills Bonhoeffers, it is too late. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article stops at the threshold of important questions.  Some 
are theoretical, such as whether conscientious exemptions to generally 
applicable law challenge the rule of law.  Other questions may be an-
swered only in the context of a particular political community’s law, tra-
dition, and ideals.  What institutions should be responsible for creating 
exemptions?  What should be their scope, structure, and the burdens of 
 
 283. For a compelling antityranny account of free exercise of religion that draws on George Or-
well’s account of a government torturing someone until he is so broken that he embraces a lie (that 
two plus two equals five) and begs for the torture of his lover, see Alan Brownstein, Justifying Free 
Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 504, 517–23 (2003). 
 284. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (collecting statutory exemptions for killing). 
 285. ARENDT, LIFE, supra note 254, at 192. 
 286. Id. at 192–93 
 287. Id. at 192. 
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proof and persuasion?  What remedies?  Should alternative service al-
ways or sometimes be mandatory?  What government interests are suffi-
cient to justify an imposition on conscience?  Should the U.S. Constitu-
tion be interpreted to provide nonreligious conscience rights?  Hopefully 
the exploration of these questions will be advanced by the conceptual 
clarifications this Article proposes.  Conscience is a universally held 
moral judge.  Its operation is influenced by the whole panoply of one’s 
beliefs, knowledge, and experience, including those that have to do with 
God and God’s will and those that are unrelated to religious beliefs or 
practices.  Religious liberty and liberty of conscience should be used to 
describe two different (though often overlapping) rights.  This notion of 
conscience is as coherent and “concrete” as many other mental states on 
which legal rights and obligations are based.  Furthermore, fidelity to 
conscience, religious or nonreligious, is valuable in its own right; it pro-
motes personal integrity and undermines government’s tendency toward 
moral totalitarianism. 
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